I love this concept. Curious if you think we should open it up to commercial innovations across our Allies? I recommend we do, since the next war will require true interoperability and coordination between us, and what better way to drive that than to allow technological cross-pollination. However, this would be an uphill battle with current legislation, policy, and within the context of the new administration.
Kristin - I believe we need to increase collaboration and acquisitions with our Allies to leverage a broader pool and drive interoperability with using common solutions. Yet as you highlight there are additional barriers and complexities to do so. I would like to see the DoD move out with the above within the US to start, and if successful a subsequent phase expand to Allied involvement.
Only real problem with this is the Acquisition culture within DOD would resist it, because it represents change and it disrupts the OEM ecosystem (which those same folks will complain about, but they are comfortable with). If you want to actually get to this sort of solution, you need to have the Acquisition executors (PMs, PEOs) working for a commander who is charged with innovation/modernization. SAEs can still provide oversight IAW statute, but separating the executors from the overseer is the right thing to do.
Mike, I wouldn't paint the full acquisition workforce with a resistance to change culture. Sure there is plenty of that in a massive enterprise, but many are focused on speed of delivery and mission impact. DoD executives could drive this and see what new opportunities emerge. Operations may drive change in key areas.
My lived experience as a Requirements guy who also worked in and with Army R&D and who is a PM Level 3, is that the vast majority of the workforce is quite satisfied with status quo. The experience of Army Futures Command stands as a testament to how that resistance to change manifests itself. When senior leaders directed change to begin the process of change they were hindered by staff within the Pentagon who felt the status quo was suitable, and when leadership changed the new leaders reverted to the old ways. Until and unless we have a cohort of senior leaders who drive the change, it will not occur; we will simply add more processes to an inherently flawed system.
I love this concept. Curious if you think we should open it up to commercial innovations across our Allies? I recommend we do, since the next war will require true interoperability and coordination between us, and what better way to drive that than to allow technological cross-pollination. However, this would be an uphill battle with current legislation, policy, and within the context of the new administration.
Kristin - I believe we need to increase collaboration and acquisitions with our Allies to leverage a broader pool and drive interoperability with using common solutions. Yet as you highlight there are additional barriers and complexities to do so. I would like to see the DoD move out with the above within the US to start, and if successful a subsequent phase expand to Allied involvement.
Only real problem with this is the Acquisition culture within DOD would resist it, because it represents change and it disrupts the OEM ecosystem (which those same folks will complain about, but they are comfortable with). If you want to actually get to this sort of solution, you need to have the Acquisition executors (PMs, PEOs) working for a commander who is charged with innovation/modernization. SAEs can still provide oversight IAW statute, but separating the executors from the overseer is the right thing to do.
Mike, I wouldn't paint the full acquisition workforce with a resistance to change culture. Sure there is plenty of that in a massive enterprise, but many are focused on speed of delivery and mission impact. DoD executives could drive this and see what new opportunities emerge. Operations may drive change in key areas.
My lived experience as a Requirements guy who also worked in and with Army R&D and who is a PM Level 3, is that the vast majority of the workforce is quite satisfied with status quo. The experience of Army Futures Command stands as a testament to how that resistance to change manifests itself. When senior leaders directed change to begin the process of change they were hindered by staff within the Pentagon who felt the status quo was suitable, and when leadership changed the new leaders reverted to the old ways. Until and unless we have a cohort of senior leaders who drive the change, it will not occur; we will simply add more processes to an inherently flawed system.