Being Responsive to Combatant Commanders
How to ensure the Pentagon, Services, and acquisition community are focused on the right operational priorities without the need for special authorities.
The primary purpose of the defense acquisition enterprise is to acquire and deliver capabilities for the operational commanders to use to deter and if necessary, win wars.
Per Title X, the military services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the forces. The Combatant Commands are joint military commands responsible for geographic (e.g., INDOPACOM) or functional areas (e.g., CYBERCOM).
Ample debate over the last few decades includes the case that the Services too often put their parochial views above those of the Joint Force (we have written about this ourselves). Combatant Commanders remain frustrated by what they view as “the system” not delivering the capabilities they require at the speed and quantity needed to complete their missions.
This was a major reason for the initiation of the European (EDI) and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives (PDI). In particular PDI was driven by years of Congress getting massive unfunded lists from INDOPACOM that the Services had seemingly ignored. The 2020 $20B wish list that INDOPACOM had submitted to the Hill turned into a 2021 NDAA provision with $6.9B allocated to address the combatant command needs. Predictably, this was hijacked by the Services (and OSD) to buy more ships and planes…when commanders really needed “long-range weapons, missile defenses, and critical enablers such as logistics capabilities, training ranges, and support infrastructure.”
To address this continuing problem, some have made the case that 5-10% of the DoD’s investment budget should be allocated directly to the combatant commands so they can acquire their priority capabilities. While they already have an O&M account today that permits purchasing investment items up to $500K per unit (can go higher with OSD Comptroller permission), acquiring major weapon systems would be a major shift in responsibilities. This change raises a slew of questions:
Should CENTCOM and INDOPACOM be able to acquire different fighter jets or ships independently to meet their unique needs irrespective of the inevitable lifecycle cost implications?
Should different CCMDs be able to buy redundant systems if they like one better than what is being fully funded by a Service? How would that work in fielding and user training?
Should they be able to buy a similar system in advance of a major procurement that a Service has been planning for many years? How will they manage the integration of the different systems?
If they assumed this more significant role, CCMDs would need to dramatically scale up their acquisition workforce. Functional combatant commands such as SOCOM, STRATCOM, and CYBERCOM execute a similar role today and have mixed success. SOCOM is an acquisition exemplar in many respects, but they also generally buy small scale capabilities for lean teams of special operators. CENTCOM and INDOPACOM would have no such luxury. While acquisition professionals assigned there would have easy access to and integration with key operational stakeholders, they would be disconnected from the larger enterprise which while often dysfunctional does provide many services needed to field and sustain an MDAP program. This is not to mention that the acquisition decision authority for a major program would very likely reside in USD(A&S) so this wouldn’t absolve CCMDs from acquisition oversight.
A good middle ground (it seems to us) is what DIU and INDOPACOM partnered to create: namely the Joint Mission Accelerator Directorate (JMAD). Its intention is “to better connect INDOPACOM’s critical mission needs with commercial industry capabilities as well as ongoing programs across the defense innovation community.” DIU even assigned personnel to serve as the JMAD CTO/Deputy Director and other roles. In this way, the CCMD community is more integrated into an acquisition body with the appropriate authorities to acquire important capabilities but at a scale that is less likely to interfere with major service investments. For instance, the JMAD initiated and continues to pursue the following efforts:
Joint Fires Network— a Battle Management System that displays real-time, fused, actionable threat data to Joint, Partner, and Allied forces, with the ability to hold those targets at risk.
Of note: This program is now being transitioned to the Air Force as executive agent which is a success story in how services and CCMDs can work together on major efforts.
INDOPACOM Mission Network — An information domain designed with native zero trust architecture (NZTA) and data centric security, capable of hosting current C2 and mission applications, while orchestrating directly with Partners and Allies and enterprise level mission partner environment.
Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability — Test, training, and operational infrastructure enabling Joint, Combined, and Coalition Warfighters, using an integrated, interoperable, mesh of networks to create a common operational picture that simulates a realistic, all-domain contested environment.
STORMBREAKER — Program to develop an AI-enabled Joint Operational Planning Toolkit (JOPT) to support planning, wargaming, analysis, and execution of multi-domain, operational-level Course of Action (COA) development.
This is one of a few examples of new organizations designed to improve focus and responsiveness for CCMD priority outcomes. However, it raises the most important question: Why is any of this necessary?
Responsiveness to CCMDs
The bigger question we need to ask is what can we do to ensure the acquisition, budget, and requirements systems are better aligned to CCMD priority needs and responsive to their unique and dynamic environments.
The JCIDS requirements process is intended to negotiate what capability needs should become formal programs (by drafting and approving requirements documents). In this way, Joint Staff is designed to be the arbiter of the Joint Force’s operational commands. However, JCIDS itself is in dire need of modernization and has failed fundamentally in playing this role.
The PPBE budget process despite the top-down direction from OSD and OMB that might attempt to resolve these CCMD disconnects regularly falls short. Too often, it falls to Congress to apply a band-aid solution (such as EDI and PDI) but major budget adjustments are challenging - especially when the CCMDs are not postured to execute large sums of funding. Congress also contributes to the challenge with its demand for highly segregated 1,700 budget lines that limit flexibility even when the Service does want to do the right thing. The 60-year-old PPBE system had an entire reform commission outline a way ahead - and that is still desperately needed.
The acquisition system, which models the PPBE process, is primarily program centric and despite the endless documents, approval cycles, and reviews also has little recourse to resolve these CCMD issues. This is primarily driven by the fact that while acquisition programs may include CCMD engagement in program execution, they take their cues from the operational sponsor - which is a Service entity,
Takeaway: Across all three of these processes, there’s a growing trend for portfolio management (at the PEO and OSD/Joint Staff level) which would provide flexibility to pivot (at least partially) to CCMD needs rather than be locked into long-term Service-driven plans is often the case today.
Annual Report Cards
One thing that is lacking in the larger capability system today is measurement of how well the CCMDs are being serviced - to meet the operational plans (OPLANS) that the President can call upon to be executed at a moment’s notice. In this regard, we see the need for a transparent report card to assess this year to year. When we helped roll out the Software Acquisition Pathway, we designed Value Assessments to drive user and sponsor engagement and focus… and also to give an honest opinion on how well user needs were being met. The ones we reviewed were frank to say the least and program offices benefited from that feedback.
“Value assessments will be performed at least annually after the software is fielded to determine if the mission improvements or efficiencies realized from the delivered software are timely and worth the current and future investments from the end user perspective. More frequent value assessments are encouraged if practical.”
For example, the program office for a software acquisition program would send the operational sponsor a summary of the last year along the lines of:
“We delivered [five] software releases that included [summary of major features delivered] along with some rapid out of cycle updates to address cyber vulnerabilities and performance issues. These addressed your priority needs of [list operational needs addressed]. We spent $50M last year to deliver these software capabilities.”
The operational sponsor would engage the commands and end users that are using the software for insights and feedback. They would provide a formal report back to the acquisition community on what is valued, what issues remain, how collaborative and responsive the acquisition and development teams were to the sponsor/users, and more. This would include tangible examples of operational impact, efficiencies (e.g., retiring legacy software and manual operations), cyber vulnerabilities patched, new operational paradigms, and more. Conversely, the assessment could include critical feedback on the software deficiencies in performance, usability, and value.
Scaling to CCMD Levels
While it would be extremely difficult to compile reports from all the CCMDs across all acquisition programs, is there a strategic classified report the CCMDs could provide key leaders in the Pentagon? Is this type of information included (even at a high level) as a major risk in the Chairman’s Risk Assessment?
If it’s not, it would be easy to Imagine ADM Paparo compiling details on which priority capabilities are still needed to support a deterrence strategy and meet OPLAN needs. It could include issues with readiness and performance of the legacy systems in theater, feedback on new systems delivered within the last few years, feedback on the planned delivery roadmaps, and priorities to shape budgets, development, and production across this FYDP and next.
While there are endless reports and briefings across the DoD, we are unaware of a comprehensive report by each Combatant Command that provides a report card of recent deliveries, feedback on projected capabilities to be delivered, operational assessments of threats and current capabilities, along with a clear prioritized list of unmet needs (separate from unfunded priority lists).
These reports could provide strategic direction for acquisition, budget, and requirements executives to shape their efforts. It could formally capture details of uncovered capability needs and help shape investments to align with priorities, including informing acquisition portfolios when to start, cancel, and/or adjust acquisition programs. While the CCMD needs and wants will always exceed available budgets, especially in this current FRA capped and CR constrained environment, there needs to be a realistic expectation of what can be delivered and focusing efforts to align to priority mission outcomes.
Ensuring Accountability
Another element is how to ensure acquisition, budget, and requirements officials are accountable to the CCMD needs? It would be a shame for significant effort to be applied drafting this complex information if key Pentagon officials ignored it in their deliberations.
What are the levers and processes to ensure accountability?
Joint Staff and the Service Requirements orgs should be directed by the SECDEF to capture 1-n priority lists (the UPLs are a good starting point) and document how they’re covered in existing or pending acquisition programs. These details could be conveyed in a dashboard in ADVANA for regular statusing by Department leadership.
The Services, CAPE, and Comptroller as part of the PPBE processes should leverage this reporting to shape the top-down planning and programming direction as well as the bottom-up budgeting processes.
Service Acquisition Executives and Program Executive Officers should provide updates on the capabilities they’re responsible for delivering mapped against the CCMD priorities. This includes the expected delivery timelines, quantities, and performance.
Increased Collaboration
Regular engagements at multiple levels between operational commands, the acquisition community, other Pentagon functional organizations, and industry are critical to success. There needs to be a deep understanding of unique environments, existing systems and operations, threats from adversaries, what’s in the development pipeline, commercial tech and solutions, budgets, risks, and planned deliveries.
The Air Force is undergoing a generational restructure around SECAF’s Operational Imperatives, which focus primarily on China, China, and China. While operational commands have their hands full keeping watch of adversaries and ensuring 30-year-old legacy systems meet minimum readiness levels, the more we can have them share views from the front lines, the better positioned we’ll be to serve their needs.
Surely some of this is happening in select forums and we are probably missing other items that should be reported up. These are just some initial thoughts for how we can start meeting the “tonight needs” better and minimize the need for special authorities and special funds.
What other examples of success exist today or opportunities for improvement to ensure we’re focusing efforts to arm our warfighters to fight tonight and tomorrow?
"To address this continuing problem, some have made the case that 5-10% of the DoD’s investment budget should be allocated directly to the combatant commands so they can acquire their priority capabilities...Should CENTCOM and INDOPACOM be able to acquire different fighter jets or ships independently to meet their unique needs irrespective of the inevitable lifecycle cost implications?"
Just think...instead of having four air forces like the U.S. does today (five if you count the Coast Guard), we could have ten if each of the geographic commands had their own! And then, does USCYBERCOM need its own? Will USAFRICOM need to stand up its own sustainment enterprise? How about a depot at Air Base 101? (guess that's not feasible in the long-run).
BL, while the COCOMS don't get everything they want, the services help drive efficiency. And sometimes the COCOMS want things they don't need (do you want a squadron of F-35s, or do you need ground attack capability with a particular type of sensor, which the Air Force can provide in a number of ways?).