Way Ahead for NGAD
How Should the Air Force Proceed?
The Air Force is in a dilemma. Too many bills are piling up all at once.
The F-35 hit full rate production and major upgrades (TR-3 and Block 4) will increase unit cost over time. GBSD (Sentinel) overran costs 81% which is now estimated to cost $141B. B-21 production is ramping up (costs are conservatively in the $750M range each, although some estimates show $668M). KC-46 production remains steady at 15 aircraft a year through FY27, but the pending bridge buy will likely see that extended by at least a few years (see asterisk in graph below). The F-22 (while a small fleet) continues to receive exquisite sensor upgrades to keep it survivable and relevant.
These acquisitions alone equate to over $17.6B in FY25 and nearly $78B across the FYDP. Enter the NGAD program, which now separates the 6th generation aircraft from the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (or CCA).
As the saying goes, a few billion here and few billion there - pretty soon it’s a lot of money. Now also add NGAS.
Adding the Next-Generation Aerial Refueling System (NGAS) in the picture requires allocating RDT&E costs in the $7B range and per unit costs anywhere from $70M to $250M - depending on size, survivability factors and form factor (based on Hudson estimates). If accelerated, as the Air Force Secretary has suggested, then that $7B bill could start to come due as soon as FY26 to meet a 2035 IOC timeline…and add directly to those FYDP bills.
Why is NGAD Now Connected to NGAS and CCA?
Initially, NGAD would not have been as reliant on tanker support given its likely larger size (and fuel capacity) and new, highly efficient propulsion system (see Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion or NGAP). However, those elements drove up the price considerably…likely to the ~$300M per unit range. Given the aforementioned bills, that was not acceptable to Secretary Kendall who is now demanding a “radical cut in capability and cost” to the NGAD program.
The likely change to NGAD would be its size (much smaller) and with a less efficient engine all which contribute to having less range and needing more tanker support closer to the fight. This brings in the need for NGAS (although the need also exists for F-22 and F-35 aircraft) because KC-46 tankers, which have zero stealth characteristics, cannot get close enough to the front lines to keep NGAD in the action without fighter pilots wasting valuable operational time commuting back to safer territory for fuel.
This is due in part to China’s ever increasing missile capability, not only in its ballistic missile and anti-ship capabilities (which get a lot of press) but also its air-to-air defenses. These are some of the unclassified ranges of different Surface and Air-Launched anti-aircraft missiles in the PLA inventory:
HQ-9 - 200km range
HQ-22 - 170km range
S-300 - 300 km range
S-400 - 400km range
PL-11 - 75km range
PL-12 - 100km range
PL-15 - 300km range
PL-17 - 400km range
PL-21 - 400km range
So now the question becomes how does the Air Force buy a reduced capability NGAD while also affording the now indispensable NGAS tanker? Is there a way to tradeoff that important capability to still get the mission done?
What Should the Air Force Do?
Some interesting opinion pieces were published that offer different thoughts:
Senators Wicker and Schmitt - How the Air Force Can Reclaim the Skies: “For the future to echo our past air superiority, we should execute a full-scale rebuilding of the shrinking Air Force. That should begin with the NGAD initiative.”
Ben Ollerenshaw - The NGAD Flop is Not Excusable: “Even though NGAD is likely behind schedule, under-performing, over budget, and otherwise imperfect; it is a fighter which could be pressed into service at some time in the next decade - warts and all; produced in moderate quantities, and then replaced by something better - something modular, even.”
David Axe - The U.S. Air Force Has Abandoned Its Sixth-Gen Fighter. America Will Still Build One: “The DoD actually has a good strategy with allowing the Navy to press forward with NGAD and the Air Force with CCA. This split approach allows both Services to benefit as they can share info and potentially work cross-Service procurements.”
Matthew Mai Air Force Leaders Are Right to Rethink NGAD: “It’s not clear a cheaper and less capable NGAD fighter would reduce overall program costs and it’s worth asking whether the goal of achieving air superiority in a conflict with China is a realistic one.”
Considerations
While we enjoy seeing a new stealthy fighter coming off the production line as much as the next aviation enthusiast and recognize there is a real need for more survivable manned aircraft if we are going to fight a stand-in war (should it arise), these are the variables that we see as important (respecting all of the opinions expressed) to this decision:
It’s not entirely clear that the Air Force will execute a war at stand-in distances (really close to the fight). The operational order of battle has always been that the stealthy assets clear the way for less stealthy ones to finish the fight. However, in the INDOPACOM theater, it’s not clear that we will have the munitions to service the needed targets (which are exponentially higher than any conflict in history). See the excellent chart from the Mitchell Institute on how long the inventory lasts.
If the way is not cleared and less survivable assets have to be committed, wargames estimate the U.S. and its allies would lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. It’s not clear if there is political will to make those sacrifices. This may all be a moot point of course if we can improve U.S. forces to have a deterrent effect - and never fight that conflict.
The Navy has initiated its own NGAD program (pronounced differently) and appears to be committed to seeing it through. The Navy expects to pick one of three contractors soon – either Boeing, Lockheed Martin, or Northrop Grumman – to develop and build the new F/A-XX fighter with deliveries beginning as soon as 2030. It’s likely to be large, stealthy, fast, and with high endurance.
The Air Force is training to operate from contingency bases in the Pacific due to the ballistic missile threats to large, established bases. See this excellent graph from the Hudson Institute that illustrates options for some fighters, airlifters, NGAS and other assets to land in unimproved airfields in relatively short distances.
The Air Force has a statutory requirement to maintain 466 tankers. It has already divested the KC-10s and the KC-135s are very old (first delivery in 1957, last one in 1965). The current Air Force plan is to retire one KC-135 for every KC-46 delivered but it may have to defer that plan given the numbers and extend the KC-135’s life. A bridge buy was planned to add more modern tankers but that seems likely to be translated into KC-135 upgrades (improved comms and situational awareness) and extension of KC-46 procurement (at least in the near term)
The F-35, with Block 4 upgrades, remains a highly relevant attack asset for the INDOPACOM fight. One estimate has Block 4 introducing over 75 major upgrades with many improvements to its suite of electronic warfare capabilities and significant software updates. While NGAD would likely have incorporated more advanced, classified capabilities, a reduced NGAD (SECAF goal of $100M) may wind up not looking that different than an upgraded F-35 or F-22.
Regardless of NGAD, the Air Force needs an NGAS capability. F-22s need to be refueled closer to the fight and F-35 has a short range that it will be limited without closer-in tanker support. We see NGAS likely being a smaller, unmanned version that can balance numerous requirements while keeping the costs down.
Our Recommendation
Given budget toplines are unlikely to improve much, modernization will converge, and the various considerations mentioned, we would recommend the Air Force chart a path in roughly the following way:
Cancel NGAD but share the technology that has been developed over the last decade more widely with other program offices (lightening the classification where possible) and certainly the Navy (this already seems underway although unclear how fully the information is being shared).
Reinvest the ~$19.6B NGAD dollars into the following key areas:
Increase B-21 production from 10 a year to 15 a year. Some are pushing for doubling the LRIP production rate but that seems overly aggressive given the early stages of manufacturing. A 50% increase would be $3.7B.
Increase production of Increment 1 CCAs. It appears the Air Force is only committed to procuring 150 CCAs from FY26 to FY30. That’s roughly 30 per year. Triple that to 90 per year to drive not only production cost savings but also deliver more capability in the near-term (along with software updates). That’s $1.5B (assuming a $25M per unit cost which is not confirmed).
Accelerate development of CCA Increment II to address some of the NGAD requirements (possibly add mission sets that are less suited to Inc I a/c). There likely is funding allocated to this but add $2B for additional development. $2B.
Accelerate NGAS Increment I to begin fielding in FY30 i.e. compress all development into the FYDP (challenging for sure) with a minimum set of requirements. Explore the potential of an Increment II tanker post-2030 to improve stealthiness or conduct major upgrades to the Inc I fleet. An acceleration would reduce the bridge buy and ensure an operationally relevant tanker was fielded to support the necessary air operations. $7B.
Reallocate some funding to missile development to support standing up new missile lines for stand-off attack and other capabilities. $3B.
Initiate the Next Generational Airlift - Last Tactical Mile (smaller, stealthier, autonomous) program to provide a capability better suited for a contested theater. Allocate $2B to provide a solid development start across the FYDP.
Put the remaining $400M towards asymmetric capabilities such as decoys or high-altitude balloons.
There may need to be funds allocated to the Navy to support any Air Force requirements as a hedge if the Air Force wanted to consider an NGAD procurement down the line BUT that $19.5B buys an awful lot in terms of relevant capabilities that can support Combatant Commanders in the relatively near-term (if the requirements are kept balanced on these new programs).
While we suspect the Air Force, OSD, and Congress have had many discussions on these topics, we offer this post for further consideration with the new administration and Congress as they shape the difficult budget decisions ahead.
great, timely summary and analysis.