I think it’s irresponsible to make assumptions on what happened in the friendly fire incident and then link it capability. It’s certainly not duct tape when legacy systems are doing the lions share of work in epic fury. There’s plenty of fog and friction in conflict that even the most perfect C2 system can’t cut through. That is a timeless truth.
There is a fine line between getting rid of old systems and developing new systems. However, if we look across our pacing adversary, there doesn’t seem to be a rush to get rid of big systems like J-16s or J-20s.
Daniel - Yes, we don't fully know the details yet on the friendly fire incident. That was intended as a passing reference as part of the broader issue of F-15 C/Ds are old. The Air Force would be more lethal operating modern platforms. A majority of Air Force (and Navy) aircraft were designed, developed, and produced last century. They are the workhorse of the force today and much respect to the pilots, maintainers, and other operators who employ them in combat.
Pete, certainly agree we need things designed in this century than last century. There is a philosophical approach here worth discussing. I would argue that our acquisition system and the way we write requirements favors the proverbial home run. Meaning each new system needs to be completely different and super advanced. Reference F-22 development. The flip side is an incremental but steady approach to develop, like getting base hits to continue with the baseball analogy. Both options score runs but one is liked more than the other for aesthetics.
In general, where does one draw the line between "we can make [current system 'x'] work by integrating [innovation 'y'] with it" versus just scrapping something entirely and starting new (looking at you, GCSS-Army)? More specifically, I'm curious how you would both apply this framework to the industrial base? Is the scrap-versus-fix decision simply a case-by-case? I think the ctrl+alt+delete idea is compelling-- especially as it applies to finding ways to fix the current incentive structures in place.
Alex, each is a case-by-case basis to do a cost-benefit analysis on continuing to upgrade legacy platforms with some high impact capabilities (or re-engine/system overhaul) vice put to a "next-gen" platform (hate that term in system titles). As we pivot to PAE portfolio management, hopefully there can be more comprehensive and continual analysis and long term planning. Have overlapping lifespans of each major platform class and regular iterations of the major components that ride on them. Working closely with industry to convey and shape short/mid/long term roadmaps of planned budgets, tech maturity, and production contracts will help.
Great article. One note is that if we are going to divest, we’d better make sure we have the replacement ready to go. If not, we risk creating gaps in capabilities.
I just know there's some field grade out there who thinks he's the DoW Sam Altman because he clumsily jerry-rigged some God awful excel product with an LLM
Even seemingly 'modern' systems are, in fact, legacy--built when design-build cycles were decades long, instead of months. For example, the Joint Fires Network has been under development since 1997, received interim acquisition guidance in 2001 under Wolfowitz' spiral development efforts, but only became a PoR this past October.
JFN was obsolete LOOOONG before its adoption by INDOPACOM for testing (2019) or by PEO-C3BM and inclusion in the FYDP (2025). It fails to address critical requirements for secure / resilient communications that the future Joint Force needs in its kill-meshes.
It’s almost as if Managed Decline and the normal extractions seen throughout history with managed decline are the true policy revealed over time… without almost.
Where is the discussion on congressional reluctance to let the service retire old systems based on jobs in their district? This is a big (perhaps the biggest) hurdle in moving to newer technology.
Also, the F-15s shot down last week were E-models, which have more advanced defensive protection that the C/Ds. We should let an investigation come to a conclusion on why they were so easily defeated by friendly fire before passing judgment on their efficacy in a future fight (disclosure, I'm not an Eagle driver, but I did stay at a Holiday Inn Express last night).
I think it’s irresponsible to make assumptions on what happened in the friendly fire incident and then link it capability. It’s certainly not duct tape when legacy systems are doing the lions share of work in epic fury. There’s plenty of fog and friction in conflict that even the most perfect C2 system can’t cut through. That is a timeless truth.
There is a fine line between getting rid of old systems and developing new systems. However, if we look across our pacing adversary, there doesn’t seem to be a rush to get rid of big systems like J-16s or J-20s.
Daniel - Yes, we don't fully know the details yet on the friendly fire incident. That was intended as a passing reference as part of the broader issue of F-15 C/Ds are old. The Air Force would be more lethal operating modern platforms. A majority of Air Force (and Navy) aircraft were designed, developed, and produced last century. They are the workhorse of the force today and much respect to the pilots, maintainers, and other operators who employ them in combat.
Pete, certainly agree we need things designed in this century than last century. There is a philosophical approach here worth discussing. I would argue that our acquisition system and the way we write requirements favors the proverbial home run. Meaning each new system needs to be completely different and super advanced. Reference F-22 development. The flip side is an incremental but steady approach to develop, like getting base hits to continue with the baseball analogy. Both options score runs but one is liked more than the other for aesthetics.
In general, where does one draw the line between "we can make [current system 'x'] work by integrating [innovation 'y'] with it" versus just scrapping something entirely and starting new (looking at you, GCSS-Army)? More specifically, I'm curious how you would both apply this framework to the industrial base? Is the scrap-versus-fix decision simply a case-by-case? I think the ctrl+alt+delete idea is compelling-- especially as it applies to finding ways to fix the current incentive structures in place.
Alex, each is a case-by-case basis to do a cost-benefit analysis on continuing to upgrade legacy platforms with some high impact capabilities (or re-engine/system overhaul) vice put to a "next-gen" platform (hate that term in system titles). As we pivot to PAE portfolio management, hopefully there can be more comprehensive and continual analysis and long term planning. Have overlapping lifespans of each major platform class and regular iterations of the major components that ride on them. Working closely with industry to convey and shape short/mid/long term roadmaps of planned budgets, tech maturity, and production contracts will help.
Great article. One note is that if we are going to divest, we’d better make sure we have the replacement ready to go. If not, we risk creating gaps in capabilities.
this is what i said with people automating sharepoint with ai…. and I don’t mean just using it as a file server, which is fine, I mean the website
stop automating sharepoint. just get rid of sharepoint. no modern organization uses sharepoint websites portals
also the self licking ice cream cones that are impossible to displace. it's Kafkaesque. they become processes that are so lodged in the govt they're so hard to remove: https://lukechen.substack.com/p/kafka-processes?utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=post%20viewer
I just know there's some field grade out there who thinks he's the DoW Sam Altman because he clumsily jerry-rigged some God awful excel product with an LLM
Even seemingly 'modern' systems are, in fact, legacy--built when design-build cycles were decades long, instead of months. For example, the Joint Fires Network has been under development since 1997, received interim acquisition guidance in 2001 under Wolfowitz' spiral development efforts, but only became a PoR this past October.
JFN was obsolete LOOOONG before its adoption by INDOPACOM for testing (2019) or by PEO-C3BM and inclusion in the FYDP (2025). It fails to address critical requirements for secure / resilient communications that the future Joint Force needs in its kill-meshes.
Well done piece, Pete / Matt!
It’s almost as if Managed Decline and the normal extractions seen throughout history with managed decline are the true policy revealed over time… without almost.
The answer; Managed Decline.
Where is the discussion on congressional reluctance to let the service retire old systems based on jobs in their district? This is a big (perhaps the biggest) hurdle in moving to newer technology.
Also, the F-15s shot down last week were E-models, which have more advanced defensive protection that the C/Ds. We should let an investigation come to a conclusion on why they were so easily defeated by friendly fire before passing judgment on their efficacy in a future fight (disclosure, I'm not an Eagle driver, but I did stay at a Holiday Inn Express last night).
As someone who was on the USS Blue Ridge (launched in 1969) LAST SUMMER, I would have loved some 1990s technology!