How To Properly Execute an MTA Program
Middle Tier of Acquisition Balances Speed and Rigor
In 2015, Congress gave the DoD a gift - the Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) pathway. It remains the best method the DoD has to rapidly deliver capabilities to INDOPACOM to deter China. Yet as Uncle Ben advised us years ago, “With great power comes great responsibility.” One must use MTA smartly to rapidly prototype and field capabilities to the Warfighters.
Some in defense appropriator staff, GAO, and OSD continue to criticize MTA either because it doesn’t conform to the textbook model or they view the designed flexibility as a threat to their power and control. The Air Force aggressively pursued MTA early on as a means to get around some of the more egregious bureaucratic elements, which naturally brought resistance from the bureaucracy.
Over 130 programs have used the MTA pathway over the first four years. Some of the early adopters have yielded awesome results. They accelerated capability deliveries by years, shaped designs before scaling production, and most importantly transformed the culture to be more agile and iterative, breaking the standard 10+ program lifecycle.
Background: Why Was MTA Created?
The late Senator John McCain, during classified intelligence briefings, came to the realization that DoD needed to change. He saw the long timelines for DoD to develop, produce, and field major weapon systems. He saw that adversaries like China were developing capabilities on much faster timelines. The U.S. military advantage was clearly at risk. Bill Greenwalt, a longtime SASC staffer with Pentagon and Industry experience, crafted the MTA provision and shepherded into the FY16 NDAA.
While the President signed the NDAA in Dec 2015, the last USD(AT&L) did not implement it. With the next administration, the new USD(A&S) after getting the new organization in place, began piloting an initial MTA policy and pathway in 2018 for the Services to experiment with, and a final policy in 2019.
MTA was created to enable rapid prototyping and rapid fielding as an alternative to the traditional DoD acquisition and requirements processes. Many flocked to it as they didn’t want to spend a decade or longer to deliver critical capabilities to the warfighter. Instead of spending a 3-4 year tour to merely advance a program to it’s next milestone, they could actually deliver capabilities to the Warfighters.
The MTA exempted programs from Joint Staff’s bureaucratic JCIDS process. Instead of taking a year to get the initial requirements approved and then two years for the JROC to approve detailed program requirements, the Services approved requirements in less than six months.
Types of MTA
MTA Rapid Prototyping provides for the use of innovative technologies to rapidly develop fieldable prototypes to demonstrate new capabilities and meet emerging military needs.
This wasn’t intended to try to fit a full MDAP lifecycle in 5 years. Instead, the model was to prototype a technology or commercial solution, quickly demonstrate in an operational environment and provide for a residual operational capability within 5 years of the MTA program start date.
MTA Rapid Fielding provides for the use of proven technologies to field production quantities of new or upgraded systems with minimal development required.
The rapid fielding path was to quickly field production quantities of new or upgraded systems with minimal development required. The objective of an acquisition program under this path will be to begin production within 6 months and complete fielding within 5 years of the MTA program start date.
How to Plan and Execute a Successful MTA Program
Have Clarity of Purpose.
Program managers, decision authorities, and key stakeholders must ensure there is a clear purpose and set of objectives for each MTA program. MTA is explicitly different from a traditional acquisition program in that not all your objectives have to be met (like a KPP) but a program should have clear targets.
Is it to explore if a commercial technology has military applications?
Is it to inform requirements, designs, and strategies for a full up system while also getting something useful to the warfighter?
Is it to have vendors compete with novel solutions to a priority operational need?
Is it to quickly field a mature product that would take years to get a Milestone C decision?
Craft MVPs and Iterate
If you’re using MTA to develop one major prototype in five years, you’re doing it wrong. Programs should scope and demonstrate a Minimum Viable Product ASAP. Ideally programs would have many prototypes as part of their MTA effort, continually iterating with active user and stakeholder engagement, all available technologies, and shaping of operational use.
This will be easier with digital technologies than military-unique hardware ones but iteration is possible in either case. Iteration is a proven approach to avoiding the historical mistakes of the traditional approach where users were requirements were locked down and user only consulted at key test events late in the program.
Mitigate Risk Upfront
Program managers should not accept multiple high risk requirements. While the MTA pathway is a prime avenue for learning, it is not the place to mature emerging technology that has not already been fielded or that is not commercially available. There is enough technology available that DoD is not exploiting to avoid having to undergo a risky science project.
Design your MTA program for three years rather than five. This will help ensure you don’t take on too much.
Avoid MDAP-size programs. Its probably an indicator that you’ve take on too much. A $50-100M MTA program is lower risk and more likely to succeed.
Avoid stacking MTA prototype programs. This really misses the point about the intent of the authority. The only stacking should be moving from prototyping to fielding.
Tailor-In
One of the guiding principles of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, codified in DODD 5000.01 and DODI 5000.02 is tailoring-in. Acquisition professionals are empowered to tailor in the documents, processes, and reviews that make sense for their program to deliver capabilities. This flips the previous mindset of making the case for a waiver to oversight organizations reluctant to do so. The MTA pathway continues to get burdened by legacy acquisition thinking and oversight (see FY23 defense appropriations bill and FY23 NDAA), driven by some in Congress and OSD. We must continue to balance speed with rigor to achieve desired results. Program managers and decision authorities must remember to tailor-in.
Pivot or Persevere
MTAs should not be viewed as mini acquisition programs. The focus is on rapidly demonstrating, prototyping, and/or experimenting with new technologies or new applications of existing technologies to explore mission impactful capabilities.
If early on you discover the program isn’t going to achieve the desired objectives, you must pivot or cancel the program.
Don’t feel locked in like a traditional acquisition program bound by their APB.
If the scope and requirements were too bold or now unachievable within available time and budgets, discuss with the operational sponsor and stakeholders what can realistically be delivered in a rapid timeline.
If the technology solution is proving to not be as mature as expected, pivot to explore a different design or technical approach.
If the contractor isn’t performing, explore pivoting to a new one. Ideally MTA programs should leverage more flexible contract vehicles with easier off-ramps if vendors can’t perform. It also helps to have multiple vendors offering competing prototypes - that while may cost more upfront has huge cost savings and impact in the long run.
Increasing funding for MTAs should be used to scale or accelerate success, not to fix a troubled program. Ignore baselines based on early cost estimates or GAO criticism. Allocate funding based on sound cost-benefit analysis and iterate.
It is acceptable for MTA programs to have a higher cancellation rate than traditional programs - fail fast. If you know you can’t get there and deliver meaningful capabilities or insights to shape other designs, cancel ASAP.
Have a Follow-On Plan
The program manager, decision authority, and key stakeholders should have a clear plan for what’s next if the MTA program is widely successful. A transition strategy should be considered early and up-front. What would the next phase entail for requirements, budgets, designs, integration, contracting, testing, production at scale, and more. Potential paths include:
MTA Rapid Prototyping to MTA Rapid Fielding to produce the capability at scale.
MTA Rapid Fielding produce version 1 with an MTA Rapid Prototyping iterating on version 2.
MTA Rapid Prototyping transition to a tailored Major Capability Acquisition to scale development and production, leveraging the MTA progress.
MTA program could transition to the Software Acquisition Pathway if the future work is primarily/entirely iterating on software / digital technologies.
Integrate the tech from the MTA program into one or more existing acquisition programs.
Summary
The MTA pathway is only four years old with some early success stories to date. It is helping to shape the culture of acquisition and operations for the better. DoD must continue to deliver on MTA programs and avoid pitfalls of traditional acquisition programs. Demonstrated success will silence the critics. As general guidelines, remember:
Smaller is better
Faster is better
More competition is better
Delegated decisions is better
Tailored processes are better
Pivot or persevering is necessary
Active user engagement is mandatory
Combatant Commanders require capabilities at scale ASAP. Many MDAPs won’t be delivered until the 2030s. DoD also requires many smaller systems to complement the major weapon systems or to address operational seams. Think critically in standing up your MTA program, plan right and execute with speed with rigor.