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Acquiring defense tech at speed and scale to secure our independence.
Welcome to the latest edition of Defense Tech and Acquisition.
Congress and the President passed Reconciliation securing $150B for defense.
Many pieces on defense tech around AI, chips, C-UAS, and industry efforts.
The Army is pursuing an AI MOS and low-cost hypersonic missiles.
The Navy is focusing on a modern arsenal of democracy and tech investments.
The Air Force has fighter jets controlling and shooting down drones.
The Space Force awards major contracts, launches sats, and pivots on others.
China invests in AI and a military city while NATO should invest in its DIB.
In addition to our Substack, we encourage you to re-read the Declaration of Independence and reflect on the founding of our great nation. Our national defense enables us to protect our rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Top Stories
Reconciliation Passes
Congress passed and the President signed the Reconciliation Bill also known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which among other things provides roughly $150B in mandatory funding for defense. The Congressional Research Service published an insight report with some of the differences between the House and Senate versions. This week we’ll have a robust, must read FY26 Defense Budget Deep Dive that will go into all the details of the core defense budget plus reconciliation.
The Telesto Decision: COFC's Latest (and Most Novel) Take on OTA Jurisdiction
The Telesto decision contains perhaps the most detailed analysis to date on when the Court of Federal Claims may hear an OTA protest. The Court introduces the concept of a "jurisdictional blackout" under which its jurisdiction depends on the particular phase an OTA is in.
Judge Hertling’s recent decision in Telesto Group, LLC v. United States provides a novel approach for determining when Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to consider a protest of a project under the DoD’s OTA.
Judge Hertling introduced the concept of a jurisdictional blackout and clarified that the Court only has jurisdiction at the phases of an OTA’s life cycle that are in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.
Those phases are at the outset of the OTA and after the prototyping phase is concluded, and the agency decides to proceed with a proposed procurement.
This decision contains the most detailed analysis to date of the circumstances under which COFC may exercise jurisdiction over a challenge to an OTA.
It offers a new framework to consider when deciding whether to protest an OTA.
This decision does not have precedential value for future COFC decisions.
Related Story: Navigating the Evolving Jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims Over OTA Agreements
Small Business Programs Play Critical Defense Industry Role
Anthony Borda and Michael Seeds
In a complex global threat landscape that is constantly evolving, innovation will continue to be critical to national security efforts to deter aggression and, when necessary, ensure American dominance on the battlefield.
Small businesses drive innovation broadly in the U.S. economy and specifically in the defense industry. Small businesses comprise at least 73% of all corporations that do business with the department, including 77% of R&D companies.
The SBIR program was established in 1982 to stimulate technological innovation; use small businesses to meet federal R&D requirements; and increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal R&D.
As Congress works to reauthorize the programs that expire at the end of this fiscal year, it will be critical to ensure they remain a viable gateway for small business innovators to meet the research needs of the federal government and help provide warfighters with the best and most cutting-edge tech available.
Getting new technologies into a program of record and/or to the commercial market is very challenging and risky. The SBIR and STTR programs provide pipelines that successfully do both.
As part of the acquisition strategy, the DoD and other agencies should review prior SBIR and STTR projects and assess opportunities to use their investments between the requirement analysis and request for proposals for other procurement solicitations.
As SBIR/STTR programs do not provide funding under Phase III, it will be useful for Congress to consider new dedicated funding pathways. The DIB recommended re-establishing the Rapid Innovation Fund and starting a new Oasis Fund to streamline delivering SBIR-developed innovations to the warfighter.
The War in Ukraine Shows the West Can Re-arm Without Re-Industrialising
Industrial capacity in peacetime is no longer necessary for success during war.
The idea that their defence industries are too slow and too small haunts Western governments. Received wisdom holds that, at least since the Napoleonic wars, protracted, high-intensity conflicts are always won by the country with the greater production capacity.
Should America end up in a long war with China over Taiwan, they ask, or should NATO have to fight off another Russian invasion of a European country, would either be able to keep up with their adversary’s war machine?
War transforms economies. The sudden, urgent need to produce more and better weapons helps conjure up new industries overnight. The pressure diverts much of a country’s labour and capital, forcing manufacturers to operate in new ways.
Industrial innovation eventually reconfigures the battlefield.
America’s defence industry is much smaller than it once was. It still accounts for 43% of weapons exported globally each year while China’s makes up just 6%.
The American defence industry makes relatively small numbers of the world’s most sophisticated and expensive military machines.
In 1956 the American air force had 26,000 planes. In 2025 it will dip below 5,000.
Since 1980, as weapons have become more complicated, the portion of the armed forces’ budget going to care for and repair existing systems has doubled.
American defence firms have naturally adapted to this rarefied approach to procurement, largely by consolidating. In 2022 there were just 29,000 of them, down from 42,000 in 2000.
A shrunken industry making such sophisticated weapons moves slowly. The result is a smaller arsenal and one that cannot quickly be replaced or expanded.
At current rates of procurement it will take seven years to bring America’s ammunition stocks back to where they were before military aid to Ukraine began.
Efforts to crank America’s war machine up a gear have disappointed.
China also has a near-monopoly on rare-earth metals that are needed to make jet engines and brushless motors which propel drones. It is the main supplier of nitrocellulose, a component of gunpowder.
Manufactured goods have become more complex and diverse. Advances in automation and precision machinery have tailored assembly lines to the goods they produce.
Ships, missiles and big weapons are not easy to mass-produce at short notice. China’s civilian shipbuilding industry makes three in five of the world’s ships, and produces warships much faster than America. Labour costs for building a ship in South Korea are much higher than in China.
Arms-makers must adapt to the specifics of the conflict and the innovations of the enemy. It is hard to know what will be needed. The assembly lines continue to creak forward. But America does not necessarily need more of them.
Our Take: This peculiar article from an anonymous Kyiv author makes cogent points about defense production and the evolving nature of modern warfare. However, its assertion that the U.S. can forgo modernizing and rebuilding its industrial base for defense is deeply misguided. The nostalgic vision of the U.S. as the WWII-era Arsenal of Democracy oversimplifies today’s complex reality. Many defense contractors already struggle to meet peacetime production demands, with supply chains plagued by vulnerabilities and bottlenecks. Scaling up for a major conflict would expose these weaknesses further. To address this, the U.S. must urgently fortify supply chains, invest in flexible, scalable production systems, and adopt a strategic high-low mix of capabilities. This includes maintaining cutting-edge, high-cost systems for critical operations while prioritizing mass-produced, cost-effective platforms to ensure resilience and adaptability in prolonged conflicts. Anything less risks strategic failure in an increasingly volatile global landscape.
Defense Tech
DOD Creating Joint Interagency Counter-Drone Task Force
DoD is standing up a joint interagency task force to tackle drone threats.
“We need an organization that is joint, interagency, has authorities, a colorless pot of money and the authorities to go after from requirements all the way through acquisition in a rapid way to be able to keep pace with that. We are in the process of standing that organization up and get it going. The Army is going to lead it, but this will be a joint organization to be able to deal with joint solutions in the future. We’ve been trying to advocate this for some time now, and the secretary recently made the decision to allow us to move out on it, because we cannot move fast enough in this space.” GEN James Mingus, Army Vide Chief of Staff
Counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) is a key challenge for the military.
Commercial technology has evolved in recent years such that drones on the civilian market are extremely cheap to buy and simple to operate.
This has made it significantly easier for nation-states and terrorist groups to procure these types of systems and strap bombs to them, allowing adversaries to level the playing field against higher-tech combatants such as the U.S. military.
While most of the Houthi drones were neutralized, the U.S. military is losing the cost-curve battle by using million-dollar missiles to defeat large numbers of inexpensive UAS.
Officials want a combination of lasers, high-powered microwaves and interceptors, which will be key to driving down costs.
The Army currently leads the DoD’s Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO), but it is unclear of the relationship between the JCO and the new counter-drone task force.
Our Take: Counter UAS is a priority joint challenge that truly requires tighter alignment across the Services’ efforts than the JCO was able to accomplish. This means mass producing the most effective C-UAS solutions for layered defense for fixed and mobile operations. Flexible funding is paramount to rapidly harness leading technology solutions in a dynamic environment. We cannot afford to go through the traditional requirements and budget processes that can take three or more years. Congressional appropriators must be willing to give up some control in exchange for increased transparency and DoD must earn the trust by delivering and iterating.
AI and War: How the DoD Can Lead Responsibly
How the DoD Can Lead Responsibly
Carol Kuntz
AI has been applied in a few substantive domains, and its implications for other domains—particularly war—remain poorly understood.
The DoD does not appear to be developing the analytical tools needed to assess systematically, much less predict, the accuracy of AI-enabled military capabilities
DoD isn’t developing the CONOPS to effectively incorporate AI into war.
The U.S. is confronting the rise of a peer competitor, as well as a host of other military dangers and problems. China fields precision guided munitions, hypersonic missiles, and fighter aircraft increasingly able to pierce U.S. air superiority, capabilities that pose risks to classic U.S. power projection forces.
AI-enabled military capabilities could help rectify many deficiencies in U.S. combat power. This assumes the effects of the AI algorithms in sensitive uses could be confidently anticipated, an assumption that the DOD cannot currently make.
The DOD must develop analytical tools to inform decisions about the use of algorithms, particularly in the context of sensitive applications like sensor and firing networks.
The authorities proposed would empower the select commanders to develop new operational concepts and AI capabilities through:
Giving them funding and decision authority for the development and acquisition of AI, related comms, and small platforms, including drones
Giving them authority and empty billets to build military and civilian teams with needed expertise through by-name requests and special hiring authorities
Empowering them to waive regulations (e.g., classification, encryption)
Allowing them to identify the tactical problems for analysis
Directing them to develop defenses against attacks on algorithms
Directing them to develop analytical tools and wargame instrumentation.
The use of sensitive AI algorithms should require authorization in the rules of engagement for a military operation.
RTX, Shield AI New Partnership for Drone and Counter-Drone Tech
Venture-funded tech firm Shield AI and traditional defense prime RTX announced today they were teaming up to put Shield software on RTX hardware.
RTX will integrate Shield AI’s Hivemind to field the first operational weapon powered by Networked Collaborative Autonomy (NCA) – a breakthrough technology that fuses real-time coordination, resilience and combat-proven firepower.
This work will be fully funded by the companies, without the need for government investment.
Hivemind is a comprehensive package of AI tools and other software that can be installed on a wide range of different unmanned systems, operating on land, sea, or air or potentially coordinating different robots working in all of these at once.
Hivemind enables the Pentagon’s preferred approach of human-machine teaming.
Shield AI built Hivemind as an highly customizable, mission-agnostic system, capable of plugging in new software modules for different tasks, environments, and types of unmanned systems.
Under the new partnership, RTX will now put Shield’s ViDAR on its MTS turrets, to enable automated AI-based sensor autonomy against maritime and airborne swarm targets. To better track and detect incoming enemy drones and unmanned attack boats. While this software would presumably be available on newly built MTS, the focus is installing ViDAR on already-installed MTSs as an upgrade.
Solving America’s Chip Manufacturing Crisis
Kenneth Flamm and William Bonvillian
Intel’s problems as resulting from a fundamental qualitative shift in the economics of leading-edge chip manufacturing for which Intel—and U.S. national security interests—were unprepared.
TSMC, the largest-scale logic chip manufacturer in the world today, discusses the relationship between scale and the cost of manufacturing logic chips.
TSMC has long classified its fabs by production capacity: mini-fabs, with a capacity of roughly ten thousand 300 millimeter (12 inch) diameter silicon wafer starts per month; mega-fabs with roughly twenty-five thousand wafer starts per month capacity; and giga-fabs, with capacities to process over one hundred thousand wafer starts per month.
TSMC currently operates four such giga-fabs, all in Taiwan, which process wafers using a mix of technology nodes ranging from 130 to 3 nanometers.
Intel is one of the last survivors, in logic and system chips, of what used to be the dominant species in the semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem: the integrated device manufacturer (IDM). Intel has been the sole de facto U.S. national champion in leading-edge logic chip manufacturing since 2010.
Intel missed opportunities in mobile and AI chip markets and failed to establish a robust foundry model, hindered by internal biases and customer concerns about IP and priority in production.
Intel Foundry is critical for U.S. national security as the only domestic option for advanced logic chip manufacturing, necessitating government support to ensure a secure supply chain for defense needs.
Recommendations:
Support Intel Foundry’s commercial viability through government backing and partnerships with U.S. tech firms.
Invest in AI-driven chip design to reduce costs for low-volume, high-performance military chips.
Develop post-CMOS technologies for future semiconductor advancements.
Coordinate DoD and Commerce R&D efforts for a unified national strategy.
What’s in a Name? Fighters, Bombers and Modern Aerial Combat
Gregory Malandrino and Thomas Mahnken
Aerial combat has evolved from dogfights between high-speed, maneuverable fighters to duels among missile-armed aircraft at long range.
John Stillion’s research demonstrated that victory no longer results from the fastest, most maneuverable fighter destroying an enemy in a dogfight. Instead, air combat today favors larger, less detectable aircraft using networked information to defeat adversaries with long-range missiles.
This shift has ushered in a new regime of aerial combat where future air superiority aircraft may resemble bombers more than fighters. The Chinese J-36, J-50 and the multinational GCAP aircraft appear to embody Stillion’s principles. The extent to which the Air Force’s F-47 and the Navy’s F/A-XX embody these design principles remains unclear.
Increasingly, aerial combat favors larger aircraft that can carry a greater number of long-range missiles and other payloads over vast distances.
Over the past 33 years, the Air Force has averaged a .46 probability of kill for each beyond-visual-range AIM-120 missile fired. Against PLAAF that would decrease probability of kill. An aircraft’s ability to carry a large number of missiles is imperative in contemporary air warfare.
The Air Force should consider nonfighter options for meeting the challenges of contemporary air combat. The size of fighters should increase, perhaps to the size of today’s bombers.
The PLAAF presents a resolute challenge to the Air Force. Compounding that threat is air warfare’s evolving character, which favors reduced signature and magazine depth over speed and maneuverability.
The Chinese and other air forces appear to have come to this conclusion and are fielding aircraft that embody these design principles.
Fielding larger, survivable aircraft for long-range air-to-air combat would take advantage of aerial combat’s transforming character.
Small Engines for Unmanned Systems Getting Big Boost
GE Aerospace and Kratos Defense and Security Solutions are teaming up to take small engines to the next level by developing a 1,500-pound thrust engine aimed at powering unmanned systems such as collaborative combat aircraft.
The two companies announced a formal teaming agreement to scale the design of the industry duo’s GEK800 small turbofan engine — a partnership started in 2023 to build a family of affordable small engines — up to a GEK1500 with 1,500 pounds of thrust.
CDAO Eliminates CTO Directorate in Pursuit of Efficiencies
CDAO’s CTO “no longer exists or manages resources.”
CDAO realized organization efficiencies in FY26 including eliminating the CTO directorate. The move has minimal mission impact given the strong technical workforce within each of its directorates.
In FY24, the CTO directorate was allocated >$340M.
Other Defense Tech News:
New imaging technique reconstructs the shapes of hidden objects
Quantum Computing: Leadership Needed to Coordinate Cyber Threat Mitigation Strategy
Army
Army Creating New AI-Focused Occupational Specialty and Officer Field
The Army is laying the groundwork for a sweeping expansion of its AI capabilities, creating new career fields as the service races to prepare for what top officials see as a tech-driven future fight.
Service planners are moving to establish a new enlisted military occupational specialty focused on AI/ML, designated 49B, according to internal documents.
A parallel track for warrant officers is also in the works, aimed at building out a cadre of technical experts embedded across formations.
The Army plans to formalize an area of concentration for officers, opening the door for troops across branches, such as cyber and signal, to build a full career in AI-related fields without leaving their core communities.
The initiative builds on efforts launched in 2018 under then-Army Secretary Mark Esper, when the service stood up the Army AI Task Force. That eventually evolved into the Army AI Integration Center, which has since been tasked with bridging the Army’s widening technology gap.
The modernization push is accelerating with Army leaders betting heavily that future conflicts will hinge on algorithms, drones and robots.
As the Army is laying the foundation for uniformed tech talent, much of the near-term momentum has come from forging deeper ties with the private sector.
Blackbeard Cheap Hypersonic Strike Missile Being Developed For Army
Army wants to see if a startup founded three years ago by former SpaceX employees can deliver a lower-cost ground-launched missile, dubbed Blackbeard, capable of engaging targets hundreds of miles away at hypersonic speeds.
The weapon is being developed in parallel with new uncrewed launcher vehicles, but could also be fired from M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers.
With a viable Blackbeard design from the Castelion Corporation, the Army says it would gain a valuable new way to quickly strike targets, including time-sensitive ones on the move, and do so relatively cheaply.
The Army is asking for $25M in FY26 to support work on the Blackbeard Ground Launch (Blackbeard GL) effort.
As of June 2025, the program office is pursuing a Middle Tier of Acquisition for Rapid Prototyping (MTA-RP) pathway, with the goal of transitioning the system to PEO Missile and Space if successful and deemed cost-effective
To accelerate development and leverage innovation, the program office is pursuing acquisition under a Fixed-Firm-Price (FFP) sole-source OTA for Prototyping with Castelion Corporation, a non-traditional defense contractor.
Castelion video on rapid development schedules and affordable mass-produced defense hardware.
Related Articles:
Hypersonic HIMARS: Army turning its most advanced rocket launcher into Mach 5 beast
Army eyes new Castelion’s Blackbeard hypersonic missile program in 2026
Army Develops Standardized Kit for Armed Drones
Army’s DEVCOM Armaments Center is pioneering a new generation of modular lethal payloads for UAS, aiming to deliver faster, safer, and more cost-effective solutions for America’s warfighters.
A cornerstone of this effort is the Picatinny Common Lethality Integration Kit (CLIK), a standardized interface that allows lethal payloads to be seamlessly paired with UAS platforms.
The CLIK specification defines mechanical, electrical, and safety architectures to eliminate costly vendor lock scenarios and simplify integration across platforms.
“This ensures a rigorous, yet flexible, process for evaluating, qualifying, procuring, and ultimately fielding safe and effective weaponized UAS payloads to the Joint Force. When we solicit industry for a capability, we will be providing Picatinny CLIK technical data so industry can focus on providing lethal capabilities without worrying nearly as much about integration.” Bhavanjot Singh, acting Executive Director of the Weapons and Software Engineering Center
Navy
Naval Strike Demands a Reinvigorated Arsenal of Democracy
LCDR Mark Jbeily
Magazine depth and the U.S.’ ability to sustain its forces in a protracted conflict are a consistent and concerning theme for naval aviation’s most senior pilot and the admiral responsible for the defense of Taiwan.
During confirmation testimony, Admiral Paparo bluntly told senators U.S. maritime forces are optimized for efficiency rather than effectiveness under fire.
Whether credible deterrence can be sustained will be decided in U.S. dry docks, in semiconductor’ fabrication facilities, and by a commercial industrial base that must be prepared to be a modern arsenal of democracy.
Questions remain about the ability of U.S. industry to sustain combat forces in a war with China.
A bold movement to reindustrialize and reinvigorate the arsenal of democracy is in progress, fueled by small and agile companies’ growing ability to complement large and experienced primes. The Navy must take advantage of it.
The U.S. Navy remains the bedrock of a credible Indo-Pacific deterrent, but the carrier air wing—the crown jewel of naval power projection and precision strike—must reorient, because in transition there is opportunity.
Even as China works to narrow the gap, emerging technology is making the U.S. advantage inherently less valuable operationally.
The concentration of combat power in fewer units and platforms makes attrition disproportionately costly compared with the past.
Precision mass is manifesting across the cost-capability spectrum from FPV drones in Ukraine to CCAs. The appeal of both ends is the ability to field large numbers of attritable systems at lower cost compared to legacy systems.
To counter unmanned aerial vehicles, the Navy will deploy the low-cost Anduril Roadrunner and Coyote systems with Carrier Strike Group 12.
The world coming into view will advantage the Navy only so long as it can field the correct mix of low-end attritable and high-end exquisite systems.
An Indo-Pacific contest will hinge on mass. A conflict with China that is not short and sharp would quickly devolve into a contest of industrial will and might. Victory would require hordes of attritable unmanned systems, deep magazines of standoff precision missiles, and hot production lines to replace the losses.
Supplying and sustaining this precision mass for a credible deterrent means asking bluntly: Is the U.S. industrial base prepared to be a modern arsenal of democracy? The movement to reindustrialize suggests it can be.
This new defense innovation base augments the legacy prime contractors, providing additional capacity across critical capability gaps. Innovative startups are creating precision-manufacturing capacity that directly feeds the needs of companies such as Boeing and SpaceX.
Most important, not only capital is flowing into the segment, but also talent. Many young civilian engineers who previously went to work for software startups are now inspired to build for the U.S. and its defense.
The Navy must attune to the supply chains of U.S. power rather than myopically focusing on the kill chains they support.
Many startups in the van of building proliferated mass operate fundamentally different business models than those of the cost-plus contractors that are the standard in defense procurement.
The Navy consistently invests less than the Air Force and Army in technology developed by smaller, nontraditional vendors. Frontier technology such as machine learning, advanced sensing, and low-cost manufacturing increasingly coming from the commercial sector creates a risk the Navy will be left behind.
The Navy must daily sharpen its tactical edge and also must stoke the fires of the reinvigorated arsenal of democracy forging its weapons.
A Workforce Strategy for America’s Shipbuilding Future
Katherine Kuzminski and Laura Schmiegel
It’s no secret that America’s shipbuilding workforce is in crisis. The nation is struggling to retain a sufficient workforce to meet existing requirements. It’s also no secret that China is outpacing the U.S. in shipbuilding at a rate of six to 1.8 combatant ships and a staggering 200 to one in commercial ships. The U.S. needs people to build ships and effectively compete with China.
This rare moment of bipartisan agreement on the need to restore America’s maritime dominance lays the groundwork to focus on practical skills, tap into patriotic and underserved labor pools, modernize hiring practices, and expand shipbuilding beyond traditional hubs.
The current ship and boat building workforce includes approximately 146,500 employees. However, workforce demands in the shipbuilding industry are projected to more than double over the next decade to keep pace with strategic requirements.
The whole-of-government strategy advocated by both the White House Office of Shipbuilding and the bipartisan, bicameral SHIPS for America Act of 2024 presents a critical opportunity for the nation to develop innovative solutions for attracting, retaining, and growing a strong shipbuilding workforce.
Skills-based hiring aligns well with professions where expertise is primarily developed through on-the-job training. This approach further aligns with societal trends, as the majority of Americans no longer believe that a college degree is worth the cost.
Roughly 77% of young men and women who seek to enlist in the military are ineligible. Rather than turning these young, patriotic-minded Americans away from a career in service, recruiting offices should direct them to maritime careers as a pathway for serving their country in a different way.
The future of American maritime dominance will not be determined solely by the number of ships launched or contracts signed, but rather by the strength and sustainability of the workforce behind them.
America’s Navy Is Falling Behind. This Plan Could Fix It
To deter China’s growing naval power, the US must rapidly expand its fleet through a modern Naval Act, embracing large block buys and innovative shipbuilding reforms to boost capacity and speed.
The FY26 budget proposal of procurement of just 19 warships. That’s wholly inadequate given the growing dangers we face from our adversaries.
When our nation was confronted with revanchist foes in the 1930s, the President and Congress implemented the Naval Act, which set conditions for industrial expansion, enabling the arsenal of democracy to win World War II. As in the 1930s, we again need a Naval Act to revive our naval shipbuilding before it is too late.
Today, our Navy musters 293 warships which is rapidly aging and nearing retirement for a fleet that is currently assessed as too weak.
The Navy is short one aircraft carrier, 19 attack submarines, two cruisers destroyers, and 47 frigates. There is a risk in maintaining the status quo.
A modern naval act, echoing the nation’s historic success in preparing for war in the Pacific, would galvanize meaningful action. This growth would be driven by orders for more warships of designs already in production.
Ordering warships in multiples, known as block buys, provides efficiencies that result in savings of up to 15%.
To enable the Navy and the shipbuilders to make the best engineering decisions and capital investments, a new contracting mechanism is needed: Shipyard Accountability and Workforce Support (SAWS). SAWS enables the Navy to authorize funds for future yearly ship procurement to shipbuilders, thereby growing capacity and workforce in anticipation of planned orders, which helps prevent delays and cost overruns.
Congress is considering the Building SHIPS for America Act to revive the nation’s lackluster commercial shipbuilding sector.
Pentagon Awards $5B Contract to Speed up Ship Manufacturing
DLA Maritime Mechanicsburg awarded a $5B contract this month to six businesses with the goal of boosting ship manufacturing at speed.
The Maritime Acquisition Advancement Contract (MAAC) is an IDIQ contract designed to accelerate procurement processes. The MAAC has five one-year options at $1B each and can potentially reach up to $10B.
The contract will see companies including SupplyCore, Atlantic Diving Supply, Culmen International, ASRC Federal, Fairwinds Technologies and S&K Aerospace manufacture parts for an array of U.S. Navy vessels, including Virginia-class nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines.
Naval Aviation: Preparing for the Next 50 Years
Naval aviation is in high demand around the globe today, and I predict it will be for decades to come. With advances in technology across all domains, U.S. carrier strike groups will continue to operate where and when needed.
Air wings will continue to advance as we field fifth- and sixth-generation fighters and collaborative combat aircraft and increase manned/unmanned teaming.
New technologies, such as AI, quantum computing, directed energy, and hypersonic weapons, will allow these indispensable, maneuverable air bases to deter, respond, and win in combat for decades to come.
Carrier strike groups (CSGs) plus naval aviation expeditionary forces (P-8 Poseidons, MQ-4 Tritons, MH-53E Sea Dragons, and E-6B Mercury) provide strong, flexible deterrence and combat power.
The carrier is my preferred combat fighting position. It can deliver all seven joint warfighting functions to combatant commanders: movement/maneuver (fast), sustainment (massive fuel for air wings plus parts and repair), protection (combined strike group), fires (a lot of fires), intelligence, information, and C2.
The most important new capability coming this year is the MQ-25 Stingray unmanned tanker aircraft with the ability to give F/A-18s and F-35s up to 15,000 pounds of fuel at a range of 500 nautical miles from the carrier.
On the weapons front, the biggest news of the past year was the unveiling of the AIM-174B Gunslinger long-range air-to-air missile.
By mid-century the landscape will be vastly different. The ranges, speeds, and effectiveness of adversary weapons will continue to increase, but there is no system that cannot be defeated.
A fundamental question will be: Can the aircraft carrier survive in a high-end fight in 2050? Making sure the answer is yes will require continual innovation—both tactical and technological.
Twenty-five years from now, the air wing will still be the main power of the aircraft carrier with a blend of fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-generation strike fighters, enhanced by manned/unmanned teaming.
The next few years will illuminate what is possible in collaborative combat aircraft, and the deployment of the MQ-25 from carriers will quicken the pace of learning and innovation.
What percentage of future aircraft will be manned versus unmanned is hard to predict, but manned aircraft will be required to some level, especially in peace and crisis response. Finding the right balance will depend largely on tech maturity, assured connectivity, and commanders’ trust.
Unmanned systems with larger payloads and longer ranges are becoming more numerous and proliferated more widely, though, so we will have to develop methods to defeat those threats and field them ourselves.
Additive manufacturing is key to reduce repair costs and shorten logistics chains.
As the coming decades bring new threats, industry partners will be key to our success. Solving the most pressing issues will require Navy/industry teams based on strong relationships and trust.
Navy Sets Sights on Fleet-Wide Anti-Torpedo Weapon Rollout in Coming Years
The Navy is adding a series of new capabilities to the current AN/SLQ-25 Nixie countermeasures suite, including a new hard-kill capability via deck launchers, set to be deployed to over 168 different front-line ships in coming years.
The hard-kill weapon, known as the Mk58 Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW), is expected to be deployed on Nimitz and Ford-class aircraft carriers initially, supplementing the Nixie’s soft-kill capability with a proven hard-kill capability that is currently deployed on attack submarines.
The plan comes after years of development and experimentation with different sensors, weapons, and configurations.
Another Navy Hypersonic Program Halted in Strategic Pause
The SM-6 Block IB, one of the U.S. Navy’s future time sensitive strike weapons soon to be fielded, has been put on hold due to internal deliberations.
The Navy has cut another upcoming hypersonic missile program expected for the fleet—this time the SM-6 Block IB. The decision to begin a strategic pause comes on the heels of a major cancellation of the fleet’s Hypersonic Air Launched Offensive (HALO) missile which was cancelled in April.
Unlike HALO, the SM-6 Block IB was going to be powered by a new 21-inch solid rocket motor, making full use of the Mark 41 VLS cell dimensions to maximize speed and range.
PEO IWS unveiled a new rendering of its design during a conference in January with essentially a brand new missile body, marking a departure from the Standard missile design, similar to the SM-3 Block IIA.
The Block IB variant is slated to have an anti-surface capability at speeds exceeding Mach 5, with additional capability for ballistic missile defense and anti-air warfare, matching the current SM-6 Block IAU which the missile builds off of.
Marine Force Design Is Four Decades in the Making
There is no crystal ball for future wars, but military history provides the next best thing. Decisions made decades ago are making an encore in today’s debate about the design of the Marine Corps.
Force Design 2030 has a foundation firmly rooted in previous decisions and analyses spanning decades and many commandants while accounting for Title 10 responsibilities, budgetary constraints, and civilian direction.
To truly understand Marine force design, one must do three things:
Study naval infantry closely. While the Marine Corps has operated as a second land army frequently throughout history, its future and current operating concepts focus on naval infantry formations.
Force design is a complicated process, and identifying what has or has not changed and what decisions have or have not been made is essential. While critics like Connable often claim the Marine Corps “chopped away at the F-35 to pay for what would become the stand-in-force,” this never happened.
Any argument that suggests the Marine Corps is rapidly pursuing and adopting technologies should reflect Marine culture accurately. The Marine Corps has not suddenly become a technophilic service.
To understand Force Design and the important role lawmakers play in military change, understanding how the Marine Corps was permanently enshrined in statute is essential.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Alain Enthoven, emphasized when tackling complex policy processes, it is important to, “Study the relevant history, and reflect on its meaning for the current problem.”
By focusing on the last 20 years, they miss the constants that have always shaped the Marine Corps throughout history: congressional direction, fiscal reality, and the unending tension between manning and modernization.
With the Marine Corps’ focus on the Indo-Pacific, an ocean sprawling over 60 million square miles, fulfilling its missions will require improvements in the management of personnel.
Smith’s planning guidance indicates comparable planning assumptions while facing budgetary constraints. It is written, perhaps intentionally, to emphasize this interdependent relationship. Smith dedicates an entire section to The Changing Character of War, and follows with a section discussing fiscal constraints impacting the Marine Corps’ ability to drive modernization at speed.
Other Navy News:
Air Force
A Spectacular Airstrike on Iran — and a Sobering Warning
Rep August Pfluger & Dave Deptula
The U.S. air attacks on Iran last Saturday — dubbed Operation Midnight Hammer — was a spectacular demonstration of what air and space power, when precisely planned and flawlessly executed, can achieve. It reminded the world that no military on Earth can match the reach, precision and lethality of the U.S. Air Force.
But behind this extraordinary success lies a sobering truth: We may not be able to do it again.
More than 125 U.S. aircraft were involved with B-2 stealth bombers flying more than 7,000 miles one way — penetrating dense, defended airspace to deliver the first operational drop of GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators.
These bombers had to operate in perfect synchronization with other U.S. assets providing tightly timed suppression of enemy air defenses, all while maintaining near-radio silence.
And then they flew 7,000 miles back — nonstop — completing the mission in 37 hours. It was a masterclass in modern air warfare.
That one-day operation maxed out our available long-range stealth strike capability. Put simply, we do not have the depth to do this kind of operation repeatedly, or at scale.
The Air Force today has over 2,600 aircraft — two-thirds of its force — made up of 10 different types that had their first flight over 50 years ago.
It also has 60% fewer combat squadrons than it had in 1991 — the last time we fought a major regional conflict.
Deterrence is predicated on the credibility of action. Credibility requires capacity.
This is why Congress must significantly increase funding for Air Force modernization and expanded end-strength if we are serious about preparing for sustained conflict against peer adversaries.
We need to accelerate and scale the B-21 Raider program.
We need to dramatically grow our F-35 inventory and rapidly field CCAs.
We need to build munitions stockpiles that can support more than a one-night raid.
We need powerful enablers like modern aerial refuelers, and the E-7 C2 sensor aircraft.
We need the airmen to fly, fix, connect and protect these aircraft.
The president needs options. Airpower gives him those options. America must not let this stunning success become a historical footnote because we failed to prepare for what comes next.
If America Wants Airpower, It Needs to Invest in Its Air Force
The Pentagon’s FY26 defense budget, submitted to Congress last week, accelerates the downsizing of the U.S. Air Force. It proposes divesting 340 aircraft, while only acquiring 76. These cuts risk the Air Force’s ability to prevail.
“Peace through strength” has been a sounding cry for the Trump administration, as it was in the Reagan era 40 years ago, but rhetoric alone cannot enhance military readiness or restore deterrence overseas.
The Air Force is unique in its scale and scope.
Airmen ensure air superiority, provide global strike and rapid global mobility, generate ISR, and enable C2 of forces.
They are responsible for two-thirds of the nuclear deterrence mission.
When the Air Force takes a hit in the budget wars, the entirety of joint force operations feels the impact.
The Air Force originally planned to acquire 132 B-2s, but post-Cold War budget cuts ended the program after only 21 were built. Just 19 remain active today.
In the 2000s, the F-22 fleet, once planned to reach 750 a/c, was cut short at 187.
Today, F-35 acquisition continues to lag years behind planned numbers.
The E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS were supposed to be replaced in the early 2000s. No airborne JSTARS replacement was ever developed and the E-3 replacement, the E-7, will be cancelled in 2026 if the President’s budget plan is adopted.
The 2020s were supposed to be the decade when the Air Force finally modernized.
The B-21 bomber, F-35, F-15EX, and F-47 fighters,CCA, T-7 trainer, Sentinel ICBM, E-7, EA-37B EW jet, KC-46 tanker, and more were all positioned to reset the force.
They still can, but it requires more money.
The impact of these cuts is clear. Fighter bases now lack aircraft, most notably Kadena Air Base, Japan—our primary air base in the Pacific.
A robust Air Force is the key to staying on top. Congress must override the Pentagon’s dangerous cuts and fund the Air Force we need to fly, fight and win.
New F-22 Upgrade Package To Keep The Jets Viable Laid Out
The F-22 Raptor stealth fighters are set to get an array of new “viability” upgrades to help protect them from emerging threats and otherwise ensure their continued relevance in future conflicts.
The package includes the previously announced Infrared Defensive System (IRDS), as well as enhancements to the jet’s stealthy features, radar capabilities, electronic warfare suite, and more.
This is separate from other upgrades in the works for the F-22, including podded infrared search and track (IRST) sensors and stealthy range-extending drop tanks.
The Air Force only has 143 combat-coded F-22s, with many typically down for maintenance all while being heavily in demand.
According to budget documents, the Air Force will provide various enhancements:
Low Observable (LO) signature management
Pilot Vehicle Interface (PVI) & Helmet Improvements
F-22 pilots are set to get Thales Scorpion Helmet Mounted Displays
Improved Countermeasures
Future crypto and cybersecurity upgrades
Dynamic Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
Infrared Defensive System (IRDS) w/EW system enhancements
IRDS is the Program of Record (PoR) for the F-22’s Missile Launch Detector (MLD) modernization effort that is focused on detection of long-range Air to Air Missile (AAM) / Surface to Air Missile (SAM) threats
The Air Force plans to acquire “185+” F-47s, which would at least allow for a one-for-one replacement of the F-22s. Lockheed Martin has also said that the Raptor could stay in service into the 2040s.
F-22 Raptors Will Be First To Control CCA
F-22 Raptor stealth fighters appear set to be the first operational airborne controllers for the Air Force’s future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones.
The service is looking to start adding tablet-based control systems and make other relevant modifications to the F-22s starting in the next fiscal year.
This is on top of a host of other newly planned upgrades for the Raptor fleet to ensure the jets remain at the very tip of the service’s spear for years to come.
Includes $15M for what is named the Crewed Platform Integration program.
The communications link between F-22s and CCAs under their control will likely leverage the Inter-Flight Data Link (IFDL) that is currently used to share data between F-22s and has anti-jam capabilities.
Pilots Fly F-16, F-15 Jets While Controlling Drones In Sky-Combat Test
In a significant milestone for next-generation air combat, the Air Force has successfully demonstrated real-time manned-unmanned teaming in a combat-representative environment.
During a high-fidelity training event over Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, pilots flying an F-16C Fighting Falcon and an F-15E Strike Eagle each controlled two XQ-58A Valkyrie drones, marking one of the most advanced operational evaluations of semi-autonomous collaborative platforms (ACPs) to date.
The successful execution of this mission validated key aspects of aircrew-drone integration. Operators controlled the drones mid-flight, delegating tactical tasks while retaining oversight, significantly reducing cockpit workload, increasing mission survivability, and preserving ethical control over lethal effects.
Can AI and Drones Replace Soldiers and Jets?
When Ukrainian drones struck deep inside Russia last month and damaged strategic bombers once considered untouchable, it sent shock waves through military circles.
Operation Spider’s Web was more than a display of technological ingenuity; it challenged longstanding assumptions about modern warfare.
An outgunned but nimble force using off-the-shelf drones disrupted a far larger adversary. Speed, asymmetry and creativity outmatched legacy systems.
Weeks later, Israel’s strike on Iranian nuclear facilities demonstrated that the future of warfare isn’t about drones replacing jets—it’s about integration.
The lesson is clear: Successful military operations no longer depend only on overwhelming firepower or technological novelty. They now require synthesis—air and ground, legacy and next-generation, human and machine.
The wars of the 21st century won’t be won by choosing between drones and jets, analog and digital, artificial intelligence and human intuition. They will be won by militaries that combine them—creatively and continuously.
While cheap drones represent the tip of the spear, they aren’t the spear itself. Israel’s air assault required a blend of stealth and brute force, AI and human judgment, unmanned systems and pilots.
America’s legacy weapons platforms—tanks, ships, aircraft—remain formidable, but they are often disconnected from one another and from the networked, AI-enabled architecture that defines modern conflict.
The U.S. often treats technological upgrades as plug-ins rather than catalysts for larger transformation.
If the U.S. can’t reconcile its industrial-age forces with digital-age demands, even a massive defense budget won’t guarantee superiority.
AI and unmanned systems must be treated as integral components of training, war-fighting culture, and objectives. A truly modern military trains every commander to think with drones, and it writes AI into the rules of engagement.
B-2 Spirit Receives New Communications and Survivability Upgrades
ACE Is All About: Dispersion Protects Airmen, Planes During Iran Attack
As the Air Force readied for its June 21-22 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the service was also putting its Agile Combat Employment strategy into action. Satellite imagery showed combat aircraft emptying Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in preparation for a possible Iranian retaliatory attack.
Some defense experts maintain that dispersing forces from Al Udeid was a successful use of Agile Combat Employment that may be more necessary in the future as threats from missiles, offensive drones, and other aerial weapons continue to threaten large, fixed air bases.
RAND and Hudson Institute have concluded that the Air Force should not rely too heavily on dispersing its forces and instead invest in hardened shelters to protect its stealth fighter and bomber aircraft from aerial attacks.
“Agile Combat employment is becoming ingrained into the Air Force’s thinking of how to operate in future contested environments, and the ability to disperse your aircraft is a highly valuable approach that can reduce the risk of being targeted, but I will say that the Air Force’s current dispersion-heavy, hardening-light approach is likely inadequate.” Tim Walton, Hudson Institute
KC-135 Tankers Set To Get Drone Launchers
The Air Force has developed a means to launch small drones from its KC-135 aerial refueling tankers, and is now looking at adding that capability to the fleet.
The Air Force says the tankers could send out UAS to help defend themselves from incoming threats and just provide useful additional situational awareness, as well as to potentially perform other missions in the future.
Work on the KC-135 Drone Delivery Mechanism (DDM) appears to have been completed sometime in FY24 but just now being acknowledged.
Air Force Again Changes Course On Tankers, Plans New ‘Production Extension’ Program
Just two years after unveiling a new tanker strategy that would involve the development of a futuristic stealthy tanker, the Air Force is shifting course for its air refueling fleet, and is now eyeing extension of the KC-46 program.
The Air Force is requesting $23.8M for the effort, which should finish developing a request for proposals by the third quarter of FY26.
One path would involve a competition that could draw rival bids for the KC-46 from industry players like Airbus and Embraer who have previously expressed interest in providing the service’s tanker needs.
It is also possible the Air Force simply decides to buy more KC-46s, either as a result of a competition or as a sole-source selection.
The new production extension plan supplants a previous strategy dubbed the KC-135 Tanker Recapitalization Program, which officials in 2023 explained would continue replacements of the aging KC-135 until a futuristic tanker dubbed the Next-Generation Air Refueling System (NGAS) could be fielded.
The NGAS platform itself — previously described as a clean-sheet design that would incorporate low-observable features, offering more survivability than current platforms that are derived from commercial aircraft — is now in doubt.
A-10 Warthog Already Has The Capability To Use Laser-Guided Rockets To Shoot-Down Drones
APKWSs featuring guidance sections with specialized Fixed-Wing Air-Launched Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems Ordnance (FALCO) software installed are now cleared for use on the F-16, F-15E, and the A-10.
The rockets use laser guidance and a proximity fuze to explode near subsonic, low-maneuverability targets like drones and cruise missiles.
APKWSs were first used operationally as anti-air weapons in the surface-to-air role, with Ukraine receiving the VAMPIRE system that has proven to be highly successful.
APKWS II has entered operational U.S. service in the air-to-air role, and has become a standout in the Middle East, where F-16s swatted down Houthi drones with it at a fraction of the price of an air-to-air missile.
The anti-air APKWSs cost less than a tenth of that.
The A-10 as a drone hunter is an interesting prospect. The aircraft’s loiter time, slow and low-flying capabilities, and even its unique air-to-air dogfighting agility, could come in as a real benefit for taking out long-range one-way attack drones.
Where the A-10 would be less effective is in rapidly taking out faster-flying drones and cruise missiles.
The A-10 lacks a radar, which makes it harder for it to independently spot an incoming aerial target at distance and successfully target and engage it.
This could potentially be overcome with a podded radar system, at least to a degree. Leveraging datalinked target tracks from off-board platforms could also significantly offset this deficiency.
On the other hand, the A-10 can also carry a lot of rockets. Extra magazine depth would be beneficial during combat air patrols that have to confront a sustained drone onslaught.
The A-10 paired with FALCO APKWSs would be most effective at defending a certain installation or limited geographical areas, such as an island outpost or forward staging area, against long-range one-way attack drones and even some cruise missiles.
Give The A-10s To Taiwan And They Can Stop a Chinese Sea Invasion
The US Air Force proposes to “divest” itself of 162 A-10 Warthog aircraft by 2026 and send them to the boneyard at Davis Monthan Airbase in Tucson, Arizona. There the A-10s would rot away in the sun.
Sending them to the scrap heap would be a massive mistake. Better to send them to Taiwan where they could make a major contribution to defending the island.
No matter how you look at it, Taiwan will have to shoulder the burden of an initial attack by China. The first few days will be critical. Swarms of Chinese invasion craft, supported by missiles and drones, will push Taiwan’s modest defense resources to the breaking point.
Taiwan’s air force consists of modernized, but quite old, F-16s and home-grown short-legged F-CK-1 Ching Kuo fighter jets.
Taiwan’s existing aircraft are unlikely to be able to stop an incoming invasion fleet, or support Taiwanese air defenses by knocking out swarms of drones.
The A-10, however, can do both jobs, and it is more sturdy and survivable than any Taiwan air force jet in the inventory.
The A-10 also has superior firepower and is equipped with new weapons ideally suited to sinking an invasion fleet or blasting away at drones.
The new star of the show is the A-10’s ability to fire the new/old 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II. See above for more details on that.
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Space Force
Space Is Hard. There Is No Excuse For Pretending It’s Easy.
The headlines in the space industry over the past month have delivered a sobering reminder: space is not forgiving, and certainly not friendly to overpromising entrepreneurs.
From iSpace’s second failed lunar landing attempt (0 for 2) to SpaceX’s ongoing Starship test flight setbacks - the evidence is mounting that commercialization of space is not progressing in the triumphant arc that press releases might suggest.
This isn’t just a series of flukes. It points to a structural, strategic and cultural problem in how we talk about innovation, cost and success in space today.
Over the past two decades, not a single private mission had fully succeeded — until last March when Firefly Aerospace’s lander touched down on the moon.
It marked the first fully successful soft landing by a private company. That mission deserves real credit.
But that credit comes with important context: It took two decades of false starts, crashes and incomplete landings — from Space IL’s Beresheet to iSpace’s Hakuto-R and Astrobotic’s Peregrine — before even one private firm delivered on the promise of lunar access.
What’s happening now isn’t innovation; it’s aspiration masquerading as disruption.
iSpace claims to be a “low-cost” provider, but that doesn’t hold up under financial scrutiny as their pricing doesn’t reflect the real cost of delivery.
SpaceX’s Starship saga is another emblem of this phenomenon. When the same core systems fail in similar ways, time after time, we must ask whether this is aggressive iteration or just poorly managed ambition. Failure alone isn’t innovation. Only failure followed by measurable, demonstrable improvement is.
For contrast, look at the F-1 engine that powered the Saturn V — still the most powerful rocket engine ever flown. Its early prototypes suffered from catastrophic combustion instability. The engines literally tore themselves apart in violent explosions.
Instead of rushing to launch, NASA and Rocketdyne engineers dedicated engineering talent analyzing high-speed film, instrumenting combustion chambers and systematically redesigning injector patterns.
They solved it — not through luck, not through iteration by crashes — but through engineering discipline. The result? A rocket that flew 13 times without a single engine failure.
That’s how space is done. Not with bravado and broken boosters, but with precision, patience and a refusal to accept “good enough.”
This is not a call for a retreat to Cold War models or Apollo-era budgets. It’s a call for seriousness. If we’re truly entering a new space age, then it needs to be built on sound engineering, transparent economics and meaningful technical leadership — not PR strategy.
Let’s stop pretending that burning money in orbit is a business model.
The Case for Space Defense
When President Ronald Reagan created the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, he challenged the nation to build effective missile defenses.
Critics labeled the initiative Star Wars, to which Reagan responded that it isn’t about war; it’s about peace. It isn’t about retaliation; it’s about prevention. It isn’t about fear; it’s about hope.
Central to that vision was a space-based layer of interceptors capable of destroying ballistic missiles in early flight.
The concept became real in the form of Brilliant Pebbles—small, autonomous interceptors orbiting relatively close to Earth and designed to collide with missiles at incredible speeds.
President George H.W. Bush embraced this concept seeing what Reagan saw: that only space-based technologies could provide the global, persistent coverage required to defend against serious ballistic threats.
China and Russia are building and deploying highly maneuverable high-speed missile systems. North Korea has tested ballistic and satellite-launch capabilities. Iran launched long-range ballistic missiles against Israel and a U.S. base in Qatar.
In this environment, a space-based interceptor layer—networked with space- and ground-based sensors and AI-enabled command systems—would help engage such threats.
Brilliant Pebbles was ahead of its time. In 1990, launch cost to orbit was $50,000 a kilogram. Managing even a few dozen satellites was daunting. Onboard computing capabilities were limited. The deployment cost for 1,000 satellites was estimated at $23 billion in 2025 dollars.
Technology has since caught up. Interceptor mass can be reduced by two-thirds thanks to advanced materials. Computing power per pound has increased 20,000-fold. The launch cost to orbit is below $5,000 a kilogram.
Commercial firms such as SpaceX have launched and managed thousands of satellites, proving constellations of this scale are not only feasible but routine. Starlink’s entire constellation is estimated to have cost less than $15B.
To be effective, the Golden Dome must cover multiple domains: space, air, land and sea. The architecture to build it is already within reach—modeled decades ago, proven technically sound, and now economically and operationally viable.
We don’t have to wait for a breakthrough. We already have the skills and tools to build a strong missile-defense system. We need only the political will to turn it into reality.
Space Force Picks Boeing For $2.8B Strategic Communications Program
The Space Force on Thursday awarded Boeing a $2.8B contract to provide secure, survivable communications for strategic missions as part of the Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications program.
Boeing edged out Northrop Grumman for the contract, which funds two initial satellites with options for the Space Force to buy two additional satellites.
The two companies have been building prototype satellites for the effort under 2020 contracts.
Evolved Strategic SATCOM, or ESS, is a successor to the Space Force’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency constellation. The new satellites will have improved resilience and cyber capabilities.
Work on the contract is expected to be completed by 2033.
The Space Force revealed in a press release that it would cancel another SATCOM program called Protected Tactical SATCOM–Resilient, or PTS-R.
The cancellation is part of a new SATCOM strategy that prioritizes delivering incremental capability on faster timelines.
The new “family of systems” approach will focus on faster delivery of anti-jam capabilities through the Protected Tactical Waveform effort.
Initial Protected Tactical SATCOM prototypes are slated to launch next year.
SDA’s Next Phase of Data Transport Satellites on Hold
The long-term future of one of the Space Development Agency’s two satellite constellations is on hold as officials study the options for replacing a planned “data transport layer” with one or more commercial solutions.
SDA’s Transport Layer is intended to be the “backbone” of the Joint All Domain Command and Control system for moving data from sensors to shooters.
The experimental Tranche 0 satellites have launched and contracts are already awarded to launch more than 300 Tranche 1 and 2 satellites beginning this summer and continuing into 2027.
Now the Transport Layer’s Tranche 3 in doubt. The FY26 budget included $1.8B to continue Tranches 0, 1, and 2—but not Tranche 3—even though Tranche 3’s FY25 funding with contracts expected to be awarded this year.
A gap in funding would push back potential Tranche 3 Transport launches beyond the originally planned start in late 2028.
The main alternative to the T3 Transport Layer is “MILNET,” a secretive “future proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) satellite communications architecture that is likely to consist primarily of Starshield-like satellites.
“DOD is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives to determine the requirements and architecture for proliferated SATCOM, to include both government-owned and commercial. A final decision on this architecture has not been made, but there is and will continue to be investment in commercial SATCOM appropriate to meet warfighter needs.”
What SDA’s Latest Win Signals For Military Space
The SDA’s experimental satellite program just kicked off with a record-fast shift into full operating mode, offering what officials see as a promising start for an ambitious military space strategy.
The Dragoon spacecraft, launched June 23, is the first of 12 satellites developed as part of SDA’s Tranche 1 Demonstration and Experimentation System, or T1DES.
With Dragoon, the program aims to demonstrate the mission viability of what’s slated to encompass a constellation of hundreds of low-Earth orbit military satellites.
T1 proves the design and capacity of the York satellite bus transporting the spacecraft, and serves as a pathfinder for T1 satellites launching this summer.
A T2 beta mission of tactical communications satellites for theater operations is set to follow, as SDA builds out its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture.
Despite initially getting off to a late start, T1DES is breaking down barriers in the acquisition process, with order-to-orbit timelines for SDA’s prototype Tranche 0 falling between 27 months to 40 months.
Traditionally, comparable DoD acquisitions would take closer to eight years.
The ability to process and fuse data onboard, in orbit, is how AI capabilities and some autonomous operations will become possible. So far, these capabilities are relatively nascent, but they’re advancing rapidly in commercial space.
“Space is now a contested domain, and one of the ways that you can assure that you can provide that capability to the warfighter is to proliferate. From LEO, you get missile warning, missile tracking, and missile defense. From MEO, you get missile warning and missile tracking, and from GEO and the higher orbits, you get the missile warning. With the three of those together, you get just an incredible amount of resiliency, so you can provide that capacity and capability to the warfighter.” Derek Tournear
Space Force Boosting an Ecosystem of GPS Alternatives in LEO
The Space Force is playing midwife to a new ecosystem of commercial satellite constellations providing alternatives to the service’s own Global Positioning Service from much closer to the Earth, making their signals more accurate and harder to jam.
PNT signals from low-Earth orbit are harder to jam, experts say, because they are broadcast from much closer to the earth’s surface.
New cryptographic techniques make the signals hard to impersonate with bogus data, a problem known as spoofing.
Two of the new constellations also plan to use a completely different frequency band for their signals, which will also make jamming more difficult and more complicated.
The main advantage of LEO is the signal can be orders of magnitude stronger when it arrives at the receiver, making it easier to receive and harder to jam.
TrustPoint was awarded three phase II research contracts from the Air Force: a Small business Technology Transfer (STTR) award of $1.6M from AFWERX and two SBIR awards worth a total of $3.8M from SpaceWERX.
Other members of the Space Force’s altPNT cadre include Xona, a California-based startup which launched its first production satellite last month and recently announced a series B funding round to the tune of $92M.
Xona aims for a constellation of 250-300 satellites and will broadcast signals in both L-Band and C-Band, partnering with receiver manufacturers to produce devices that can receive both GPS L-Band and LEO PNT C-Band signals.
Xona, TrustPoint, and other LEO PNT startups will have to contend with an incumbent; Iridium has been providing an L-Band PNT service for eight years, initially in partnership with Satelles, until Iridium acquired them last year.
Space Force to Fund Development of Atomic-6 Solar Power for Satellites
Composite materials startup Atomic-6 secured a $2M agreement with the U.S. Space Force to mature its solar power array for military satellite applications.
LeoLabs Secures Military Funding for Missile-Tracking Mobile Radar
LeoLabs, a California-based operator of ground-based radars for tracking objects in low Earth orbit, has secured $4M in funds to upgrade its mobile surveillance radar.
DOD To Tap Second Vendor For MEO-Based Missile Tracking Sats
The Space Force awarded a $1.2B contract to BAE Systems Space and Mission Systems–formerly Ball Aerospace–to build 10 satellites over two planes for Epoch 2 of the Resilient Missile Warning and Tracking (MWT) contract.
The first satellite delivery is expected in 2029.
Now, Space Systems Command is preparing to tap a second vendor to build at least one additional plane of satellites for Epoch 2, with contract award expected in either late fiscal 2025 or early 2026, “depending on budgets.”
Millennium Space Systems, a Boeing subsidiary, is building 12 satellites in two planes under the program’s Epoch 1 contract.
The first plane is scheduled to begin launching in 2027–about one year later than originally scheduled–and the second plane is expected to launch around 2028.
The delay in launching Epoch 1 stems in part from a change in contract approach. Raytheon was to build three spacecraft under that contract, but the Space Force cut the contractor in May 2024, citing schedule delays and cost overruns.
SSC has also experienced supply chain issues, as well as design challenges that impacted the Epoch 1 deployment schedule.
The forthcoming Epoch 3 development will include an optical crosslink standard that would allow for multi-plane and multi-vendor connectivity and likely have increased battlespace awareness requirements, along with other capabilities.
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International
International
Full Stack: China's Evolving Industrial Policy for AI
China wants to become the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. To achieve this goal, Beijing is deploying industrial policy tools across the full AI technology stack, from chips to applications.
By 2030, Beijing is aiming for AI to become a $100B industry and to create more than $1T of additional value in other industries.
This expansion of AI industrial policy leads to two questions: What is Beijing doing to support its AI industry, and will it work?
Beijing is using a wide variety of policy tools.
State-led AI investment funds are pouring capital into the development of AI models and applications, including an $8.2B AI fund for start-ups.
China is building a National Integrated Computing Network to pool computing resources across public and private data centers.
Local governments from Shanghai to Shenzhen have set up state-backed AI labs and AI pilot zones to accelerate AI research and talent development.
All of this state support comes on top of tens of billions of dollars in private AI investment from Chinese tech companies, such as Alibaba and ByteDance.
Still, such investment trails private investments in the United States, such as OpenAI’s Stargate Project investment of $100–500B.
The United States enjoys a large lead in total compute capacity, partly because of export controls even though Beijing is supporting the development of domestic alternatives to Nvidia graphics processing units (GPUs), such as Huawei’s Ascend series, which lag behind in performance and production volume.
Another issue that Chinese AI developers are facing is a lack of mature alternatives to U.S. software.
Beijing’s support for open data-sharing platforms is likely to play a greater role in advancing China’s AI industry by increasing general access to large training sets without the ownership complexities of a data trading exchange.
China’s AI industry enjoys an energy advantage for data centers, driven by aggressive state-backed power infrastructure expansion and the strategic deployment of renewables at large-scale computing hubs.
Strengthening NATO Starts with Fixing Its Industrial Base
Decades of defense industrial atrophy following the post–Cold War peace dividend have left NATO ill-equipped to meet the demands of today’s geopolitical moment. U.S. adversaries, on the other hand, are stepping up the pace. Meanwhile Putin’s war machine is speeding up,” and assessments have found that China is outpacing the U.S. defense industrial base.
The transatlantic defense industrial base has long been disjointed, duplicative, and inflexible—and a range of regulatory, political, and cultural factors have worked to keep it that way.
Each European state manages its defense industry at a national level, making it difficult to forge a unified defense vision across European NATO.
Indigenized defense capabilities often outweigh production efficiencies and industrial integration, even if the “go-it-alone” approach is more expensive.
The U.S. has historically had little incentive to encourage an integrated European defense industry, as its fragmentation helps preserve its defense firms’ market dominance.
A study that surveyed some of the United States’ closest industrial partners—those with a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP MOU) called for reengineering U.S. export controls.
RDPs relax provisions in the Buy American Act and allow foreign vendors to be considered domestic sources.
As of 2025, 28 countries have RDP MOUs with the United States.
Similar to ITAR and TSFD, survey respondents identified Foreign Military Sales (FMS), the mechanism through which foreign governments procure U.S. defense systems, as particularly onerous. It can take years to clear the Letter of Request, Letter of Offer and Acceptance, and Congressional Notification process.
The United States could establish a combined review process of weapons requests from its allies to help alleviate prolonged procurement timelines and ease bureaucratic burdens.
Neither the United States nor its allies can confront today’s security challenges alone. The transatlantic defense industrial base has many fault lines, and the upcoming summit offers a critical opportunity to address longstanding pressure points—chief among them a glacial FMS process and an ITAR regime ill-suited for modern defense cooperation.
Why the US Should Give Australia Its Old B-2 Fleet
Robert Peters and Parker Goodrich
America’s venerable B-2 stealth bomber fleet is in its twilight years. Over the next 10 years, the B-2 stealth fleet will be gradually replaced by the next-generation stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider, which is currently in production.
Under the current plan, the B-2s will be retired to the “Boneyard” at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base outside of Tucson, Arizona.
Every aircraft retired to the Boneyard carries a financial burden. Given the still state-of-the-art stealth technology and secretive nature of the stealth bomber, it will require extra security and maintenance.
Each B-2 costs over $2 billion to develop and build. Rather than prematurely retiring these valuable assets, the United States should consider transferring all 19 of the B-2s to an ally, free of charge.
Granting the stealth bomber in its totality to Australia would allow the bombers to live out the full extent of their operational lifespan (around 2040).
By gifting the B-2 fleet to Australia, these aircraft could keep flying and provide increased allied resilience at the edge of a contested region, and complicate Chinese decision-making at the same time.
Taiwan Looks to New Sea-Drone Tech to Repel China
Taiwan is accelerating efforts to develop a high-tech fleet of naval drones that military planners see as a potential game-changer in the island’s ability to fend off a possible Chinese invasion.
Ukraine’s success in using sea drones to erode Russia’s naval superiority in the Black Sea offers the possibility that the weapons could be used to establish supremacy over the Taiwan Strait and hold off an amphibious attack by China.
Taiwan plans to begin to introduce sea drones to its naval forces this year.
Taiwan could use sea drones lying in ambush along shipping routes as an effective deterrent.
Taiwan is working to gain the capability to build large numbers of sea drones and acquire advanced systems to make them effective, an effort also under way in the island’s development of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Taiwan has found it difficult to build a domestic aerial drone industry that doesn’t depend on Chinese parts.
For sea drones, the primary challenge of building a domestic industry is cost on an island with a relatively small market.
Planners aim to kick-start local industry with government funding and contracts, with the U.S. providing expertise to bridge technological gaps.
What Ukraine Stands to Lose
Here’s a list of the equipment that was paused while awaiting further DoD review:
92 AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided, air-to-air missiles
30 PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancements (MSE), an advanced missile interceptor part of the Patriot missile defense system
8496 155mm rounds
142 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, often used against tanks and other armored vehicles
252 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) precision-guided rockets, a key component of the HIMARS platform in use by Ukraine’s military
25 Stinger surface-to-air missiles
125 AT-4 recoilless anti-tank guns
Related Article: Ukraine arms freeze part of wider military aid review, Pentagon says
Other International News:
Norway Defense Industry Part of Trend To Boost European Capacity
Japan Gaining Traction Developing Its Defense Innovation Ecosystem
Congress
House Leaders Aim to Replace Rather Than Fix DoD Acquisition System
The top Republican and Democrat on the HASC say making DoD acquisition less risk-averse will be a big focus of this year's NDAA.
“They’ve just got to understand that we’re not looking for a no-risk situation, and that’s going to require us to change too, Congress can’t be pouncing every time they try something and fail. Failure can be and is a way to learn, but we want to incentivize that, which is why we’re empowering acquisition professionals. Most people want responsibility and the power to do things and make things happen and be rewarded for it, and we think this system sets that up, and we’re trying to send a signal that we’re going to not reward people who are risk averse and are trying to be bureaucratic in their processes.” Rep Mike Rogers, HASC Chairman
After a few years’ lull, it’s time again for Defense acquisition reform.
HASC leaders say they’re aiming for a wholesale replacement of the DoD acquisition system. The goal is mainly speed, but also a more empowered acquisition workforce, a willingness to fail fast, and a more diversified defense industrial base.
The SPEED Act is meant to be the first of several upcoming overhauls to the Defense acquisition system. And unlike previous waves of reform, it’s less focused on the minutiae of process than on the structure of the overall system.
Under the SPEED Act’s revised structure, senior Defense officials would be responsible for determining whether there’s a valid requirement for a new system under a streamlined process.
Another major change would be an overhaul of DoD’s requirements process. A Hudson Institute study found it currently takes >800 days for a requirement to get analyzed, documented and validated by the detailed work of the JCIDS.
Industrial base changes would build on the success of organizations like DIU.
This is going to be an evolutionary process.
“I think the federal workforce is incredibly capable, we’ve just set up a system of rules that make it impossible for them to do their jobs. We’re not empowering them to use their talent to get to an outcome. Some people are better at things than others, so we need to make those types of judgments and pick people who are good. But I think in a lot of cases, you’ve got people who could be so much better if you would just empower them.” Rep Adam Smith, HASC Ranking Member
Podcasts, Books, and Videos
Driving Innovation in Defense: AFC and DIU w/Jeb Nadaner, Fed Gov Today
Marc Andreessen on AI, Robotics, and America’s Industrial Renaissance, American Optimist
Bunker Busters and B-2s w/Dr. Melvin Deaile, Modern War Institute
How DIU is Using AI to Connect Commercial Innovation to the Warfighter w/Cheryl Ingstad, NDIA ETI
Silicon Valley’s Turn to Defense Tech w/Horacio Rozanski, WSJ Big Names
Opportunities in Defense Tech Investing w/Ted Mortonson, Bloomberg
Enabling the Space Force to Move Faster w/John Conafay, Second Front
Speed of Relevance, Maritime Autonomy, and Defense Acquisition w/Noam Oz, Startup Defense
Scaling a Dual-Use AI Company w/Brian Drake, Crossing the Valley
Why China is Building a Military City 10 Times the Size of the Pentagon, WSJ
Upcoming Events and Webinars
The Future of Federal Acquisition, GMU, Jul 9, Virtual
Capitol Hill Modeling and Sim Expo, NTSA, Jul 10, Washington DC
Understanding, Securing ATOs w/Tyler Sweatt, Anthony Macera, Jul 11, DIU
Reindustrialize, Jul 16-17, Detroit, MI
Ascend, Jul 22-24, Las Vegas, NV
Space and Missile Defense Symposium, Aug 5-7, Huntsville, AL
Fed Supernova, Aug 19-21, Austin, TX
2025 Space Warfighter Forum, NDIA, Aug 26-28, Colorado Springs, CO
Emerging Tech for Defense Conference, NDIA, Aug 27-29, Washington DC
See our Events Page for all the other events over the next year.
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Brilliant and simple insight by a young Service man today:
Drones should be classed as Ammunition.
Which Drones are, and expended at the same rate, as fast as they can be produced and employed.
“FPV attack drones will be classified as ammunition, fiber optic drones especially.”
@mushkelji
https://open.substack.com/pub/mushkelji/p/americas-infantry-has-a-drone-problem?r=91o16&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false
Thanks for taking the time to put this huge amount of info together. Tons of useful information and exciting news.
My publication focuses on reindustrialization and defense tech, so the section about America "not needing" to reindustrialize especially interested in me. Much of the author's argument stems from the fact that if in wartime, the American economy would refocus and strain to meet the demands of war. However, this applies to our adversaries' supply chains too. China out-produces us in peacetime, and they're surely better positioned to outproduce us in wartime. As far as shipbuilding specifically: not only do they build far more warships, but even their civilian ships are built to be able to be retrofitted into a military vehichle if needed.
The claim that our economy would rise to the challenge is also optimistic in that it assumes the same culture as we had in WW2. Unfortunately, levels of patriotism have sunk far below what they used to be, and knowing a lot of the people in my own generation, there would be far fewer people willing and able to work in factories and manufacturing. Our cultural shift may be the most dangerous factor of all. Curious to hear your thoughts on this. I'm subscribing!