Joint Force = Mass * Acceleration
To accelerate delivery of capabilities to the Joint Force, we need to reduce mass.
Newton's second law of motion states that F = ma
Net force is equal to mass times acceleration.
“A larger net force acting on an object causes a larger acceleration, and objects with larger mass require more force to accelerate. Both the net force acting on an object and the object's mass determine how the object will accelerate.”
Within the DoD, we are focused on arming the Joint Force with the latest capabilities to deter or win wars.
For over two centuries we’ve amassed systems and fought in many wars. The systems have grown increasingly larger and more complex. The DoD bureaucracy has similarly accumulated significant mass.
Consider in WWII, the U.S. mass produced thousands of aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles. We were able to do so in part because of our massive domestic production capacity and the relative simplicity of the systems. Modern systems are exquisitely complex, requiring advanced materials, manufacturing equipment, and millions of lines of software code. The DoD continues to progress along Augustine’s Law XVI:
In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3-1/2 days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.
When Russia once again invaded Ukraine in 2022, the U.S. provided Ukraine with thousands of munitions. Yet we soon realized it would require billions of dollars and potentially five years to replenish our munition stocks.
DoD executives champion the need for production at scale. Yet constrained budgets, lengthy continuing resolutions, and inability to divest of legacy weapon systems and infrastructure from the last century imposes horrific tooth to tail ratios. While the Air Force and Navy decry the smallest force in decades or longer, the current environment retires systems faster than delivery of new weapon systems.
The defense acquisition system should have two primary measures:
Mass. Capabilities delivered to operational commands.
The DoD, SAEs, and PEOs should publish annual reports summarizing what capabilities they delivered in the last fiscal year. How many systems did you deliver? How many system upgrades (hardware and software) did you deliver? Ideally, the report would also quantify the operational impact of these deliveries. Given the nature of this report, it would need a classified version and a public unclassified version.
Speed of delivery.
How much time will it take to deliver each major weapon system? What steps are the DoD and Congress taking to accelerate those deliveries? We can debate whether the Davidson Window of 2024-2027 being the peak risk window for China to advance on Taiwan is a real concern. What few could argue is the DoD is not moving fast enough to deliver meaningful capabilities to INDOPACOM and other combatant commands. We must go faster. We must accelerate.
The annual acquisition report should include the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Full Operational Capability (FOC) of each major weapon system in clear tables. These will highlight the long, long timelines to go from Idea to IOC - the years to go from program initiation to when operational commands have that capability available. DoD previously focused on timelines from Milestone B (the decision point to enter development) to IOC, yet we must examine the full lifecycle. See, for example, some of DoD’s largest programs:
DDG1000
Jan 1995: Achieved Milestone 0.
Aug 2022: Conducted initial employment.
27.6 Years.
F-35
Nov 1996: Concept Demonstration Contract Award
Jul 2015: Marine IOC
Dec 2023: Full Rate Production Decision
18.7 Years (IOC) and 27 Years (FRP)
OCX
Feb 2007: Air Force bean OCX program with Tech Development phase
May 2024: Block 1 Ready to Transition to Operations (RTO)
17.3 Years
We will act with urgency to build enduring advantages for the future Joint Force, undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly.
Similarly, the defense bureaucracy has such a large mass that nothing short of another major attack (akin to Pearl Harbor or 9/11) would force it to drastically accelerate. The Pentagon, Congress, and industry are burdened by decades of bureaucratic debt. From massively high pension costs, crumbling infrastructures that have fallen into disrepair, decades of prescriptive policies and laws, clinging to legacy or inefficient systems because of ties to jobs or donors, to parochial Service/unit interests.
We must continue to apply force across all elements of the defense enterprise to drive acceleration wherever we can. From leveraging rapid prototyping, acquisition, and contracting practices to modernizing the PPBE budget and JCIDS requirements systems to enable greater speed and agility.
To accelerate delivery of capabilities to the Joint Force, we need to reduce mass.
Reduce the scope and complexity of major weapon systems so we can deliver faster.
Leverage mass with thousands of small and medium systems (often autonomous / unmanned systems) to complement the massively large and complex weapon systems.
Streamline the bureaucracy across all sectors (DoD, Congress, and Industry) so we can harness top tech, talent, and funding to accelerate deliveries and maximize mission impact. Focus more resources on the tooth, not the tail.
Delivering new capabilities enables retirement of costly, burdensome legacy systems, manual processes, and gross inefficiencies, which in turn frees up funding for greater mass and acceleration of newer capabilities.
Joint Force = Mass * Acceleration
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Great analogy!! One more example to emphasize why the acquisition must get faster. Fielded, less complex numbers count more than complex systems stuck in the acquisition cycle.